Question
Assume that we have 2 identical firms. The timing is as follows: Firm 2 chooses to Enter or Not. If it enters then Firm 1
Assume that we have 2 identical firms. The timing is as follows: Firm 2 chooses to Enter or Not. If it enters then Firm 1 moves first and chooses it's quantity. Firm 2 observes firm 1's choice and then chooses it's own quantity. Each has a constant marginal cost of 40 and the follower firm (Firm 2) has an entry fixed cost of = 25 which it pays only if it enters. If it does not enter the Firm 1 is the monopolist. Suppose we are looking at a market where market demand is mkt = 100 (or equivalently = 100mkt). What is the market outcome? Is there a way that Firm 1 can credibly threaten Firm 2 so it chooses not to enter?
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