Assume two firms that produce complementary components, X and Y. The components are always consumed in a fixed proportion, i.e. for every unit o X, two units of Y are required. The respective prices are Px and Py. Consequently, the package price is Pp- Px 2Py. Assume that the demand f , Q = a-PP. with a > 0 and where Q-X-Y/2. unction for the package 1S (i)Suppose that the X and Y firms are independent. Find the Nash- Bertrand equilibrium in prices, the quantity produced of each component and their profits. (ii)Assume now that the firms merge. Calculate the monopoly equilibriunm prices, quantities and the monopoly profit. Compare finally the package prices and profits of the firms before and after the merger and argue if the merger improved the welfare of society or not (iii) Assume two firms that produce complementary components, X and Y. The components are always consumed in a fixed proportion, i.e. for every unit o X, two units of Y are required. The respective prices are Px and Py. Consequently, the package price is Pp- Px 2Py. Assume that the demand f , Q = a-PP. with a > 0 and where Q-X-Y/2. unction for the package 1S (i)Suppose that the X and Y firms are independent. Find the Nash- Bertrand equilibrium in prices, the quantity produced of each component and their profits. (ii)Assume now that the firms merge. Calculate the monopoly equilibriunm prices, quantities and the monopoly profit. Compare finally the package prices and profits of the firms before and after the merger and argue if the merger improved the welfare of society or not (iii)