b. Again, whoever visits a city most gets all the votes from that city, and if the two candi- dates visit a city the same number of times, then the votes from that city are split equally between the two candidates. However, now say that if neither candidate visits a city, then the people in that city feel unloved and do not vote for anyone. Make a prediction using iterative elimination of (strongly or weakly) dominated strategies. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. c. Now say that the votes from a city are split between the candidates proportionally accord- ing to how many visits each candidate made to that city. For example, say candidate 1 visits Alberta twice and Baja once, and candidate 2 visits Alberta three times and Baja not at all. Then Alberta voters see two visits from candidate 1 and three from candidate 2, which is a total of ve visits from the candidates, and so 2/5 of Alberta voters vote for candidate 1 and 3/ 5 of Alberta voters vote for candidate 2. Since Baja voters see one visit from candidate 1 and no visits from candidate 2, all Baja voters vote for candidate 1. So candidate 1 gets a total of (2/5)120 + 180 = 228 votes and candidate 2 gets a total of (3/5)120 + 0 = 72 votes. Make a prediction using iterative elimination of (strongly or weakly) dominated strategies. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (Note: if neither candidate visits a city, assume that votes in that city split equally between the two candidates. In a previous version of this problem, this aspect was not made clear. It is OK if you assume that if no one visits a city, then no one from that city votesyou can do the problem this way too.) Last name First name Student ID number TA 2. Say that a country is composed of two cities, Alberta (120 people) and Baja (180 people). There are two political candidates, in the closing days of the campaign: each candidate has time for three campaign visits. Each candidate decides how many times to visit each city: a candidate can visit Alberta three times and Baja not at all, Alberta twice and Baja once, Alberta once and Baja twice, or Alberta not at all and Baja three times. A candidate's payoff is the total number of votes the candidate gets from the two cities. a. Say that whoever visits a city mosh gets all the votes from that city. If the two candidates visit a city the same number of times, then the votes from that city are split equally between the two candidates. In particular, if neither candidate visits a city, then that city's votes are split equally between the two candidates. Model this as a strategic form game. Make a prediction using iterative elimination of (strongly or weakly) dominated strategies. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game