Cameron(Cam)Barker,founderandCEOofBlakeSportsApparelandSwitchActivewear,cutacross the parking lot to his car after a long day at company headquarters in Birmingham, England. Hewaspreoccupiedbyaphonecallearlierthatdayfromamemberofhisexecutiveteam:twomembersof the team had failed to cooperate to resolve a simple issue, and the caller had asked him to intervene.Latelysuchincidentswerealltoofrequent.Individually,theexecutiveswerecompetentmosthadbeenatthecompanyforseveralyearsandcontributedsubstantiallytoitsgrowthbuttheteam'sdynamicsweredysfunctional.Mistrust,lackofcommunication,andrefusaltocollaboratewererampant. Barker was ready to act, but what action should he take? Were the right people in the rightroles? Were the right people even on the team? Was the team appropriately structured and managed?WhatchangesshouldBarkermaketostrengthenthecompany'sleadershipandpositionitforcontinuedgrowth? (SeeExhibit 1for an organizational chart; seeExhibit 2for profiles of executive-teammembers.)

BlakeSportsApparel

Blake Sports Apparel, founded by Barker's father, paidlicensing fees to leagues and brands inordertomanufacturesportsapparelandaccessoriesusingtheirlogos,whichtheyinturnsoldtoretailersinthe marketplace. A decade after its founding, Barker formally took over the family business as CEO.At the time, Blake Sports Apparel's manufacturing licenses were with several small brands; shortlyafter Barker began his tenure as CEO, he met the founder of the mid-size brand Cartlock and beganmanufacturinggoodsforthatcompanyaswell."AtthetimeCartlockwasat$25million.ThenCartlockwent from basically zero to a billion," Barker recalled. "We rode the wave through them going public.NinetypercentofourbusinesswasdefinitelyCartlock;wewere15-20percentoftheirbusiness."

Ten years later, despite the partnership's success, Barker started to feel uneasy about Cartlock'slong-term direction. After contemplating his options, he decided to approach Howell, a large globalbrand.Theinitialmeetingwentwell;shortly,BarkerfoundthathehadtonegotiatehiswayoutofhisdealwithCartlocktotakeonadealwithHowell.Healsohadtoquicklyupgradeinfrastructureto

handletheHowellbusiness.Hedescribedhowtheexecutiveteamhadfunctionedduringthatpressuredperiod:

We had one year when we were exiting the Cartlock business and introducing theHowellbusiness.Thismanagementteamwasdrinkingfromafirehose.Weweredealingwithalotofexternalandinternalchallengesthatwereverycomplex.Cartlockwasaverydynamic,thought-provokingcompany.Howellwasaverymature,well-establishedcompany.Andtheninternally,asanentrepreneurialcompanyingrowthmode,weneverhad enough resources to get everything done, not enough hours in a day. But we wereperforming.Weweredoingsomethingthatwouldneverlikelyhappeninsportinggoods,and that was literally shipping Howell and Cartlock in the same year. People werewearingmultiplehats,meaningonemorningtheyweresellingHowellproductsandthenintheafternoontheyweredealingwithCartlockproducts.

Oncethetransition to Howell was complete,new challenges arose.Howell was pricing its productsso low that it had essentially eliminated the typical margin that a company in Blake Sports Apparel'sindustry would expect. Blake Sports Apparel was also shipping Howell products globally, which wasextremelyexpensivegiventherelativelysmallquantitiesinvolved.Theexecutiveteamspentfivemonths trying to solve these problems: they traveled the world, surveyed the marketplace, examinedpricing,andfamiliarizedthemselveswithcustomers.Whentheseeffortslargelyfailed,BarkerapproachedHowelltorenegotiatethetermsoftheirdeal."Needlesstosay,thesixmonthsofrenegotiation with Howell was another stress point for the executive team," Barker said. "I had alreadygiven up the Cartlock business; I had signed the Howell deal, and I couldn't execute it the way I initiallysignedit.Theexecutiveteamwasloyalasanythingduringavery,verydifficulttime."BarkerultimatelyrenegotiatedtermswithHowellthatweremutuallybeneficial.

Thefollowingyear,BlakeSportsApparelbuiltaglobalinfrastructureandbyfiveyearslaterithadtripleditsHowellbusiness.ThecompanyworkedwithmorecategoriesintheHowellportfoliothanitscompetitorsandwasontracktobecomeHowell'slargest-volumepartner.ItwasalsofullyintegratedwithallofHowell'sbusinessunits."Thiscompanyisstillyoung,andit'sgrowneveryyearexceptone[the year it transitioned from Cartlock to Howell]," Barker pointed out. "If you look at the aggregategrowth, it's about 28 percent a year." Growth continued: Howell awarded Blake Sports Apparel a licensethatincludednewproductcategoriesandrightstousetrademarksendorsedbypopularprofessionalathletes and professional sports leagues. Blake Sports Apparel was about to sign what Barker called"oneofthestrongestlicensed-sporting-goodscontractinthehistoryoflicensedsports."

TheCultureoftheExecutiveTeam

Asayoungentrepreneurialcompany,BlakeSportsApparelhadpursueditsgoalswithunusualflexibility;initially,veryfewpoliciesandprocedureswereinplacetoimposestructure.Asthecompany developedastrongerrelationship with Howell,that profilebegan to change.Theexecutiveteamhadtobemoremethodicalanddetail-orientedtosustainthegrowththecompanywasexperiencing.AndrewCook,ChiefFinancialOfficer,explained:

Up until three years ago, this company was run by revenue; revenue was the king. Soaslongaswe couldgetrevenue,wewerefine.ThenCamsaidweweregoingtocomeupwithwhatwecallalandedmarginequation[thecostofgoods,FOB,1freight,andduty,

compared to the net selling price]. And we won't necessarily just look at the revenue; we'llalsolookatmargin.Bydoingthat,wesawthatsomeofourbiggest-sellingitemsthatwewere high-fiving each other across the company for, as our number-one selling items,wereeither lowfromaprofitabilityperspectiveorwe margined ataloss.

Another challenge that needed to be addressed was that individual departments built their ownreportingmechanisms.Sometimesagivendepartment'smetricslookedfavorable,butdidnotworkinthe company's favor when viewed in terms of the big picture. For example, Operations authorizedmanufacturing a particular product in large quantities during an off-peak season to create inventoryand reduce the product's cost. The Sales department agreed to the plan and put the product on auto-replenishment status; thus, a customer could request the product from inventory at any time, whichwouldhopefullycreateorincreasesales.Butthequantitieswerenotalwaysaccurate.Sometimestheproduct did not turn over at the expected rate and ended up sitting in warehouses for months,consuming cash. At other times, due to auto-replenishment, the company sometimes lacked theappropriate quantity on hand to meet a customer's needs and had to pull the product from othercustomers to fill an order. Thus, though Operations was producing the product for a lower price andSales had inventory for its customers (pulling either from the warehouse or from other customers), thesituation was unfavorable overall. Zachary Fried, GM of North America Sales, described the impact ofacloselookatthemetrics:

Wewentfromaverylucrativecompany,whereyoucouldn'tfindanyerrorsbecauseofitsfast-pacedgrowth,toacompanythatallofasuddenhadtostartlookingatitselfdifferently.Wewerestillgrowingveryfast,butwealsohadtoworryaboutdifferentareaswithinthebusinessmodelthatrequiredourconcentration,likeFOBs,margin,anddiscounts.Then,allofa sudden, the finger-pointing started: everyone wanted to blame someone else for anyperformancegapsweuncoveredwhenwestartedtodrilldownintothenumbers.

Barkerdescribedtherolehehadplayedinimposingmorestructureonthebusiness,particularlyafterrenegotiatingtheHowelldeal:

We were in survival mode, and then we had to refocus. We put a ton more processes andproceduresinplace.Wewenttoaglobalbank;weupgradedoursystems.Wespenttimelookingatoursupplychains,ourKPIs[keyperformanceindicators],ourFOBs.Wespentalotof time looking at growth and revenue and really understanding what was really happening.Weeliminateddiscountsandshutdowncustomersthatdidn'tmakesense.Imaginewhatthiswasdoingtotheexecutiveteam:theyhadmadeit,andtheyhadallthisfreedombecausetheywereentrepreneursintheirownworlds.ThenI,astheCEO,putalotofredtapearoundthemand didn't let them have as much flexibility as they usedto have. People had been operatingincrediblyflexibly.Forexample,itwasnauseatingtolookatexpensereportsandseewhatpeoplethoughtwasOK.Itwasnotasstructuredasitneededtobe.

Members of the executive team also found themselves running bigger departments than ever beforeandworkingcloselywiththecompany'sgrowingnumberofaccountants.Overall,Barkerwaspleasedwith the team's performance; general counsel Lance Templast concurred, commending them as "anoverall good team that knows the business." But persistent roadblocks prevented the executive teamfromperformingatthetopofitsgame.

ExamplesofExcellence

Executive-teammembersdescribedtheircolleaguesvariouslyaspassionate,entrepreneurial,knowledgeable,competent,self-motivated,anddedicated.Theyalsopraisedtheteam'senergetic

conversations and good debates. "We're a super-talented group of individuals that are extremelyknowledgeable about our industry in sporting goods," said Christopher Hennessy, Head of GlobalProductandMerchandising."We'repassionateandloyal,andcollectivelyallofuswanttoachievethegoalsthatwesetasacompany.Ithinkthosearethecommonthreadsandthebondsthatpullustogether."

Thepreviousyear,BlakeSportsApparelhadreacheditsaggressiveinternationalanddomesticmargin and revenuegoals.Despite frustrations along the way, the executive team got thejob done,resulting in a5-percent bonus forevery employeeat thecompany.Thanksto collaboration betweenthe Sales and Product departments, the company reached number-one in the world for sales of certainproducts,insomecasesovertakingitsbiggestcompetitor:Cartlock.Thecompanyalsosecuredfinancingfromaglobalbank,whichobligedeveryonetoadheretostrictpoliciesandprocedurestoobtainstrongauditresults.Butthesesuccessesobscuredthechallengesfacingtheexecutiveteam.

Challenges&Opportunities

Despite the executive team's skills and successes, failures of communication and collaborationplagued its internal workings. One year, for example, Blake Sports Apparel received numerous inquiriesfromretailersinterestedinsellingitsproducts.Buttheteamfailedtocooperateinatimelymannertoenter these new customers into its system. Procedures outlined in the customer compliance manual, suchas how goods would be shipped to a customer, were not systematically and speedily signed off on. Somecustomers'"testorders,"aroutinepartoftheset-upprocedure,wentunprocessed.Andtheexecutiveteam failed to make timely business decisions, such as how much credit to extend to a customer. As aresult,customerswerestillwaitingsixmonthslatertobesetupinBlakeSportsApparel'ssystems.Thisinactionresultedinmonthsoflostrevenue;meanwhileproductssatindistributioncentersinsteadofreaching store shelves. Customers were frustrated; Barker speculated that they mightultimately taketheirbusinesselsewhereorplacesmallerordersthantheyhadinitiallyplanned.

Anotherproblempertainedto"gapplans,"orlistsofactionitemsgeneratedannuallybyreviewsofthe previous year's revenue data. These plans identified opportunities for the company to reach itsgoals, and included such items as developing new products and revamping existing ones. EverydepartmentplayedaroleingeneratingandexecutingagapplanaplanstartedinSales,movedontoProduct, and required the involvement of Finance and Operations to assess its viability. Six monthsafter the most recent gap plan had been finalized, the executive team was failing to develop newproducts outlined in the plan, resulting in lost time and revenue and creating urgency for employeesintheirdepartments:suchnewproductshadtobedesigned,developed,sourced,setup,andshippedwithin the calendar year. Meanwhile, demand for new products thathad beenlaunched was sometimesmiscommunicatedbetweentheSalesandProductdepartments.Forinstance,thecompanyhustledtoproduce a product under the misapprehension of high demand at one of its largest customers; once theproductwasready,theordernevermaterialized.

Pricing was also problematic. New products and those that were revamped or revived after beingdiscontinued were referred to Finance to assess margins and determine pricing. This process often tooklongerthannecessary,delayingreleaseoftheproducts.TheFinancedepartmentinturnclaimedthatpeople had been slow to submit such necessary information as packing and shipping costs andexpecteddiscounts.OthersclaimedthatFinancehadbeenvagueabouttheinformationitneeded.

Barkerofferedthisanalogytodescribetheexecutiveteam:

Like in sports, sometimes a team wins that shouldn't winmeaning there's fivesecondsleftontheclock,theteamplayslousy,butsomehow,someway,theballgetsoverthelineandtheteamwins.Wewin.Idon'tknowhowwedoit,buteveryyear,yearafter

year, you cannot look back at this company and see what we've done and not wonderhow we did it. But how we played the game is insane. We make it so hard. We drop five-yard passes over and over again; it's like we didn't just talk and get on the same pageabout how we're going to run the play. The other thing is we're not dealing with the minorleagues.We'redealingwithHowell.Thebarissetsohighthere'strulynofinishlinesoeven if you think you've done a good job, even if you think you left it all on the field, youhavetodomore.I'mtryingtomanageanexecutiveteamataveryhighlevel,andI'mnotsayingIhaveanexecutiveteamthat'snotperformingtheyareperforming.They'rejustnot coming togetheras a team.Sometimes Ithinktheapproach they taketo theircolleagues is: 'I'm going to get this guy off the field. I'm going to crush him. I'm going tohithiminthekneesandprovethathecan'trunthatplay.'That'swhereitgetsfrustrating.

Goals&Priorities

Though convincedthat misalignment of goals was resulting in competing priorities, Barker had notyet pinpointedits exact location.Company-widegoals,establishedby theexecutiveteam during anoffsitewithBarker,focusedonmarginandrevenue;a5-percentcompany-widebonuswastiedtoachieving thosegoals.Barkeralso collaboratedwitheach teammemberto establishweightedKPIsspecific to his or her department. At individual performance reviews, Barker scored executives on eachobjective (25/50/75/100 percent of a KPI); the executives scored themselves as well. If the two scoresdiffered, Barker explained his score and the executive did the same. Then they jointly determined eachfinal score. These scores were then weighted to determine the bonus the executive would receive. Thisprocess was identical for all members of the team. Barker also earmarked discretionary funds to furthercompensate someone who had had an exceptional year. He reported that this process was well receivedandthatexecutivesviewedtheirgoalsandKPIsasclear,butsometeammembersassertedthatmisalignmentpersisted.AccordingtoHennessy:

Theopportunitiesexistaroundmakingsurewe'renottryingtoachievecompanygoalsin silos.In our business, when we are setting goals ourselves around revenue targets andmargintargets,sometimesthosegoalsgetpulledinseveraldifferentdirectionsbyallofthe socioeconomic issues that can occur outside of what we can control. I think there'salways that struggle between Sales, Product,Operations, andFinance to figure out ourindividual goals, and how we prioritize those individual goals so that collectively we canachievethegoalswesetasanorganization.Sometimestheydon'talign.

CFOAndrewCookconcurred:

I think sometimes there are areas of frustration, because the goals set for the executiveteam aren't aligned. Maybe one is chasing sales, and then the other one is more concernedabout margin, and a third one is concerned about making a cool product, and the fourthoneisconcernedaboutgettingtheproductmanufactured,andnoneofthegoalsforthoseobjectives are tied together. As a result, what might be good for one person may notnecessarily be good for their colleagues. It creates conflict and trust issues. I think that'sonereallybigopportunityforustoimprove.

Goals that appeared to be aligned in theory were not always aligned in practice: sometimes teammembers pursued self-interest before company goals. Olivia Hermida, Division President at SwitchActivewear,asubcompanyofBlakeSportsApparel,observed,"Theexecutiveteamconsistsofcompetitors that want to win. Overall that is a great thing, but it does create challenges at times."SeveralmembersdescribedtheteamasconsistingofType-Apersonalities:self-motivated,aggressive,anddriventoperfection.

Communication

Inadequate communication among members of the executive team was a multi-faceted issue. Oneaspect was withholding of information. Carl Herman, Senior Director of Planning and Procurement,describedbarriershefacedasa directreporttoa memberof theexecutiveteam:

WeprovideinventoryreportstotheSalesteam.Wetriedtoimprovebyprovidingnotonly the inventory we have but also the associated sales data for the inventory we soldpreviously. We tried to provide more integrated information to our Sales team so they arebetter equipped to sell. But when we provided those reports, the Sales director feltinsulted.Hethought,'Oh,youthinkmyteamisnotdoingtheirjob;youneedtogivethemthis information.' That's not my original intent. I don't care whether you look at thisinformationornot.Ijustwanttoprovideyouwithbetterdatatosupporttheprocess.

The other thing is how secretive we are with information. For example, we cannot putinformation forkey accounts inthesamespreadsheet.Their pointis, 'No,we don't wantthe sales reps to look at all of our customer data so they can compare. They should onlyfocus on their accounts.' The Sales portion sits only in their own silos and focuses only onwhat their accounts are doing, not really caring or learning about what the other accountsareselling.Idon'tthinkthatisoptimal.

Barker responded to the criticism that team members withheld information by pointing out that theinformation-sharingprocesswasdesignedtoprotectproprietaryideas.Inthepast,departingemployeeshadabscondedwithpricingmodels;topreventmoresuchtransgressions,Barkerhadempowered the executive team to determinewhoshould have accesstowhatinformation (asopposedtoallowingopenaccessforall).Butevenwheninformationwasshared,itwassometimespresentedina format that managers found inaccessible or difficult to leverage.The combination of apparent secrecyandthecompany's privately heldstatusledemployees to question thecompany's financial standingandthedegreeofitsprofitability.

Another instance of withholding information was the Finance department's failure to inform theexecutiveteamwhenbonuseswouldbepaidout;thus,thisinformationcouldnotbecommunicatedtoemployees.Oneexecutivecharacterizedthissituationas"playingagameofKeepAway"withinformationthatothersneeded.Thispropensitytowithholdinformationledteammembersto"makedecisionsinavacuum,"asoneexecutiveputit.

Even when information was forthcoming, open communication was hindered by lack of trust. Forexample,whenFinanceinformedSalesthatthecompanywaslosingmoneyonagivenproduct,theSales department's reaction was to question the pricing analysis. Similarly, the Finance and Productdepartmentssometimessecond-guessedtheSalesdepartment'sdecisionstodiscountpricesonparticularproducts forits customers. Theinformationthat hadfedinto thesedecisions was availableto all involved, but the executive team did not collaborate in order to build a cohesive sales strategybecause individuals did not trust one another to prioritize the good of the company over their ownrespectivepriorities.

Another issue was lack of responsiveness. "I think if people would communicate and answer their e-mailsandberespectfulandresponsivetotheircolleagues,wewouldbefine,"observedAmberMcKinnon, Barker's executive assistant. "Cam will set up calls and meetings and people just won't showup. It seems if you have something that's pressing and you go to another team member and ask for fiveminutesoftheirtime,itjust doesn'thappen."Another examplepertainedtothe99-weekcompanycalendarthatwasposted forallmembersof the executiveteamandcontainedallkeycompanydeadlines.

The deadlines were habitually ignored, which led to otherwise avoidable issues, such as missing shippingdates to customers. Barker was often the one who had to step in to address issues as they arose. "I wouldassume things were getting done and my team was working together," said Barker, "But then there wouldbe the fire, and the next fire, and the next, and that's what it would take to get things to the finish line. I'dhavetowaitfortheexplosion,andthenI'dhavetogoinandcleanupthemess."

Animportantpartoffacilitatingcommunicationamongtheexecutiveteamwastoleverageefficientand effective team meetings, an objective of which the executive team often fell short. The executive teammettwiceweekly:onceinarevenuemeetingattendedbymultiplefunctionsattheexecutiveteamlevelandthelevelbelow,andonceinacheck-inmeetingattendedbytheexecutiveteamviaphone.Althoughteam members did make the effort to attend the check-in meetings, no one set an agenda, so the meetingsoften ran for an inadequate length of time. For example, some meetings that needed to be two hours werescheduled for one. Important topics were often shortchanged and not given the time necessary to beaddressed. As a result, many meetings ended with unresolved issues, but the team did not schedulefollow-up meetings to continue the necessary conversations. Therefore, issues remained unresolved untilproblems or disputes emerged. The executive team also met with Barker twice monthly: once in abusinessupdatemeeting,andonceinanS&OP(SalesandOperationsPlanning)meeting.Barkernotedhow participation in team meetings was often unbalanced. As Barker described, "I think at a certain pointpeoplejustgiveupthefight.Evenifsomeonehasahealthyargumenttogiveinregardtoatopic,theyanticipatetheletdownofthegroupnotbeingabletocometogethertosolvetheproblem,sotheydon'twant to bring it up or engage in the type of active discussion we would want to encourage." Teammemberswere"scarred"fromtheirpastexperienceswiththeteam,accordingtoBarker,andtheymadeit clear in their behaviors that there was little trust in the team's ability to work together. As Barkersummarized,"Themeetingstructurewasinplace,butcommunicationinthosemeetingswasajoke."

Finally, conflict resolution was poor. The executive team was adept at debating but inept atresolvingconflictandbuildingconsensus.Muchcommunicationwasdefensive:executive-teammembers sometimes brought subordinates to meetings to witness what was said, or copied the generalcounsel on email communications. Team members also leaned on Barker to step in and mediatedisputes. For example, Barker recalled two team members who met with him about a dispute, and eachbrought with him to the meeting a binder of emails detailing their electronic communications with oneanother. Barker noted, "God knows how long it took to get those binders put together. They spent moretimedoingthatthanactuallyworkingontheissue."Theteammembers'lackofabilitytoworktogethertoresolveconflictsamongstthemselvesultimatelycostboththeteammembersandBarkertimethatcouldhavebeenspentinmoreproductiveways.

FocusonManagementandLeadership

Someperceivedtheexecutiveteamasstrategicinitsthinking,butseveralpeopledescribeditsmembers as overly focusedon day-to-day tactical matters,which shouldhavebeen theprovinceofmiddlemanagers.Hennessysharedhisperspective:

Achallengethatwehaveisthatwetendtobeaverytacticalgroupandprobablynotas strategic as we need to be, as the leadership team of an organization that has beengrowing as fast as we've been growing. Sometimes, being tactical and being on theground, we lose sight of what the bigger picture should be and could be. What has hurtusisnotempoweringourmid-managementteamtobefullyresponsibleforwhat'sgoingon with the day-to-day of the business, and reporting up to us what that looks likesothatwe,asanexecutiveteam,canreallyfocusonthenext24to36monthsanddrivethecompanyforward.Oneofourbiggestopportunitiesasanexecutiveteamistobecome

morestrategic.Ifwetrytoattackourchallengesfromacompletelytacticalperspective,we'llneversucceed.

Failuretodevelopmiddlemanagershadotherramificationsaswell."Someexecutive-teammembers are slow to evolve their departments, as far as upgrading the talent pool of people. I've alsobeenpushingthemontheirlackofsuccessionplanning,"observedSteveMyers,anexternaladvisor."I don't feel that any one of the departments has someone that could step in and take over, and that'sleaving Cam and the company very vulnerable." Barker elaborated: "They are all producers. But theyloweroverallproductivitybynotlettingthepeopletheyhiredproduceforthem.Theirmicromanagement leads to loss of productivity and loss of growth of people in the organization." Headded, "They struggle to utilize the leadership tools they have available in the organization to motivatetheirteamstoreachhigh-achievingresults."

PowerDynamics

At times the executive team's structure and distribution of power prevented it from performing as acohesive group. A manager compared it to other executive teams he had worked with at other firms: "Ithinkthattheoverallexecutiveteam'spowerstructuresinothercompaniesaremuchmorebalanced.Here,Finance controls the majority of the company, and also the products." One executive asserted that theFinancedepartmentshouldbebetterintegratedwiththerestofthebusiness,citingspecificshortcomings:"The Finance department provides a lot of feedback on what's wrong but no solutions. Feedback is givento others prior to the people directly responsible for the issue. There are many more questions or steps tosomething that should be simple to execute. There's a belief that people are not qualified or smart enoughortrustworthy."AlthoughCookwasatechnicallycompetentCFOandseeminglyinvestedindoingrightbyBarker,hispeersreportedlyfoundhimtobedifficultandmanipulative.

The degree of control wielded by Finance, and lack of trust between it and other departments, oftencaused processes to stall when they reached the Finance team. "Finance focuses too often ontheir needs,withoutconsiderationandsupportfortheentireteam,"oneexecutivesaid."Theyneedtothink,'Whatcanwedotosimplifyprocesses,allowingtheotherdepartmentstoworkmoreefficientlyandeffectively?' Again, it's the silo approach.Due to Finance's control, bottlenecks often occur." In fact,some departments felt so unsupported by Finance that they created new positions and hired their own"shadowfinanceteams"tomeettheirneeds.

Attheotherendofthepowerspectrum,theexecutiveteamfocusedsointentlyontheHowellbusinessthat it sometimes failed to adequately support Switch Activewear, a subcompany that Barker had recentlyfounded in the past year. Switch Activewear, whose business was manufacturing accessories underlicensetorelativelysmallbrandsandcustomizationservices(applyingnames,logos,andnumberstoapparel),wasbuilttoleverageBlakeSportsApparel'sinfrastructure,includingsourcing,sales,billing,andshipping.Bydesign,itwashighlydependentonBlakeSportsApparel'ssupport.SwitchActivewear's offices, located in Edinburgh, Scotland, employed about ten people; another couple ofemployees worked in Birmingham at Blake Sports Apparel's headquarters. Because it had little to do withthe Howell business, it was routinely perceived as a lesser priority. "Cam has a vision that includes SwitchActivewear," Hermida explained. "With the Blake Sports Apparel team [pursuing] a proven Howellmodel,itisunderstandablethatSwitchActivewearisconfusinganddisruptive.TheSwitchActivewearteam objective is to create an infrastructure that will be successful in this [Blake Sports Apparel's]environment."Inacompany-widesurvey,aBlakeSportsApparelemployeecommented:

There'salotgoingoninEdinburgh.TheSwitchActivewearteamistryingtolearnourprocess, get up to speed, grow the business, and it seems to be overwhelming for them.TheSwitchActivewearteamis havingahardtimeplanningandexecuting ontheirown.

It would be more beneficial to focus only on sales [and] business development, and/orgetmoreprofessionalresourcestohelpthemtaketheleadandbringtheirprojectshomebeforestartingtenothers.

In Barker's opinion, the executive team's slow onboarding of Switch Activewear resulted in fourmonthsoflostproductionandrevenue.Processeswerenotstreamlinedinatimelymanner,andninemonthsafteritsfoundingSwitchActivewearstilllackeda websiteand onlinesalescapability.

TheChiefExecutiveOfficer

In the course of analyzing the dynamics of the executive team, Barker also had to examine his ownleadership. The majority of the team characterized him as a passionate entrepreneur and visionary withbothstrengthsandshortcomings;hewasdescribedasinspiring,empowering,andtalented,forexample,butnotasacoachtohisteam.Asaself-identifiedintrovert,headmittedtospendinglittletime engaging socially with colleagues. "I'm not a CEO that needs to be the loudest guy in the room,"Barkersaid.Hennessy describedhim as "very goodat knowing what buttons to push,andwhen topushthem,inordertogetthatmaximumeffortoutofpeoplewithoutburningthemout."Thougheffective at driving his executive team to perform, Barker sometimes failed to hold people accountable."As a group, we talk about what needs to be done, and then I back away," he admitted. He was alsosomewhatdisconnectedfromtheday-to-daydetailsofthebusiness,devotingmostofhistimetostrategy andtoleveragingexternal resources, such asprofessionalorganizations, tohelphim thinkthroughstrategicissues:"I'mnotintheweeds.Idon'tliketheweeds,"heexplained.Barkeralsoexpressedapreferenceforsuccinctsummariesofoperationalissues,accompaniedbysuggestedsolutions:"Ilikethesummaries,with solutions to thesummaries,in regards to what wecan do,andwhatweshoulddo."Barkerpossessedawillingnesstosurroundhimselfwithpeoplewithstrongerskillsinareaswhereheneededhelp,butthecompanylackedacross-functionalinternalleadertooverseeday-to-dayoperations.

Barker's detachment from daily operations was a possible factor in the existence of competingprioritiesatthecompany.JudithSoule,GMInternational,observed:

Sometimes Cam is the one that is causing the chaos in the group, because of all theentrepreneurshipandprojectshe'sworkingon.Ithinkhesometimesputsthingsonpeople's desks that are not aligned with the global strategy for how we want to push theHowell business. He could be stricter, to keep us focused on our main priorities and makesure we're not getting sidetracked. That's a difficult one, because in his role as CEO heshould push us, I think; but on the otherhand he isalso the one that puts these sideprojectsonourdeskswithadeadlineofthenext24hours.

Justastheexecutiveteamsetanexamplefortheirsubordinates,Barkersetthetoneforhisteam.Often,hereadilyadmitted,hepresentedhimselfverycasually:"AlotofthetimeI'minshorts,at-shirt,andtennisshoes."Theexecutiveteaminturnwaslessthanprofessionalinverbalcommunicationswithoneanother.

WorkingtowardSolutions

Barker considered it urgent to address the executive team's challenges. A strong, united team at thetop would position the company better to address the challenges and opportunities of the months andyears ahead: for instance, in addition to taking on the additional Howell product categories and furtherintegratingHowellandBlakeSportsApparel,BlakeSportsApparelwouldprobablyneedtoexpanditsecommercebusiness,implementbettersystemsandprocesses,increaseinnovation,helpgrow

Switch Sportswear, and reassess its businessmodel.Barker credited the executive team withmanysuccesses, but enumerated the ways that its dysfunctional dynamics hurt performance: "We're missingrevenue,missingopportunities,notmakingquickerdecisions,hurtingrelationships,andhurtingcommunication.Wedo lots ofgoodthings,but theperception is ourmanagement team hates eachother." The tone set by the executive team also reverberated, impacting how people at all levels of thecompanyworkedtogether,aswellashowthecompanywasperceivedbyexternalparties."Theexecutive-team members look at one another as competition, not as collaborators. They're setting anexample," said Herman. Another employee spelled out the consequences in a company-wide survey:"Executives are not getting along, not dealing with their differences directly, and putting staff in themiddleof their fights,which makes the situation very uncomfortable. Itnegatively affects employeeinter-andintra-departmentmoraleandotherwisegreatstaffrelationships."Thetensionbetweenexecutive-teammembersalsocausedsomeemployeestocreateanallegiancetotheirrespectivedepartmentheadon theexecutiveteam,attimes refusing to collaboratewithotherexecutive-teammembers,whotheyviewedasadversariesoftheirbossandtheirdepartment.

Asheturnedtheignition,BarkerremindedhimselfthattheexecutiveteamwascapableofexceptionalperformanceandhadsupportedBlakeSportsApparelthroughyearsofsustainedgrowth;its members had been loyal in times of crisis and uncertainty. On the other hand, animosity amongteam members sometimes impeded performance and eroded morale. Executives even badmouthedeachotherandreportedeachother'smistakestoBarkerinsteadofofferingoneanothersupport.Theexecutive team itself saw a need for change. Asked to rank their performance as a team, they scoredthemselves3.2ona1-5scale(individualscores:2/2/3/3/3/3.5/4/4/4.5).Somemembersdescribedthe team as average, "passing, but not honors students," or "in the middle"; others scored the teamlower for reasons such as "inefficiency due to distractions"; still others assigned the team higher scoresbecause, as one put it, "the company wouldn't be where it was if the team wasn't performing at arelatively high level." Perhaps tellingly, one executive said he would award the team a 4 or a 5 exceptforonememberwhodeservedalowermark.

Although BlakeSports Apparelhadexperiencedaggregatedgrowth ofabout28percentperyearover the course of the company's history, in the current year, they were facing growth only in the highsingle digits. Several oftheir brick-and-mortar customers (including major big box retailers such asSports Authority,Sports Chalet andCity Sports)haddeclaredbankruptcy,unableto keeppacewiththeincreasingdominanceofonlineretailers,suchasAmazon.Infact,thatsameyear,almosttwohundred sporting goods stores declared bankruptcy, signaling a challenges time for the industry andimpactingseveralofBlakeSportsApparel'skeyaccounts.Barkerneededtheexecutiveteamtooperateas seamlessly as possible to rebound the next year back into a growth rate of 20+ percent. Furthermore,Barkerneededtheexecutiveteam to work togethertoreach his longer-term goals forthecompany:fivehundredmilliondollarsinrevenuebyfiveyearslater,andonebilliondollarsinrevenuebytenyearslater.Althoughthecompanyhadgrownundertheleadershipoftheexistingexecutiveteam,Barkercouldnothelpbutwonderhowmanygrowthopportunitieshadbeenlostduetotheirinabilityto work together and align themselves for the benefit of the company. He wondered if and how theexistingteamwouldbeabletohelpthecompanydealwithitscurrentchallengesandreachitsambitiousgoalsforthefuture.

Barker summarized his challenge as he was starting to see it: "If I don't do something, the team isgoing to crumble. On this particular team, players need to be traded. Is the team going to dissolve, oram I going to control how it dissolves? How am I going to dissolve it in regard to pace, timing, andwho is going to move on from the group?" Did the team really need to be dismantled? Was there anyway Barker could intervene before the team got to that point? Or was the team already there? HowshouldBarkerproceed?

Question 1 This is a two-part question. First, did Baker have the right people in the right roles on the executive team? If not, what should be changed? Second, how could Barker bring the executive team together to consistently perform at their very best, so as to more effectively and efficiently reach or exceed the company goals?