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6. According to the author, does capitalism have a distinctive dynamic? What are the three interrelated propositions about trends in the articulation of the economic and political in the next period of capitalism?

I have attempted three tasks in this brief contribution. The first is to pose once again the key question of the nature of capitalism, its overall dynamic and its possible future(s). In emphasizing the self-organizing capacities of the capitalist economy in its inclusive sense (reflected above all in the self-valorization of capital as it metamorphoses through different moments in the circuit of capital), I have highlighted one distinctive feature of the capitalist mode of production and related it to the commodification of labour power. These features give capitalism its distinctive dynamic and also give a certain form-determination to class struggle and competition in the capital relation. At the same time I have emphasized that capitalism is not a self-contained system but is struc- turally coupled to its environment. This serves both to keep the future of the capitalist economy open (while nonetheless making its trajectory non-arbitrary and path-dependent) and to create various interfaces between the developmental logic of capital and its class struggle, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the instrumental and communicative rationalities of its environing institutional orders and lifeworld together with their distinctive forms of struggle and resistance.

Structural coupling means that political changes cannot just be derived from changes in the economy and, conversely, that economic changes are shaped in part by those in the political system. This complicates predictions about the future of the nation-state. Since other contribu- tions discuss this, however, it is certainly worth addressing this issue here. Let me first advance three interrelated propositions about trends in the articulation of the economic and political in the next period of capitalism (for more extended treatment, see Jessop, 1995). These three trends have many different causes and cannot be ascribed exclusively to the crisis of Fordism or the alleged transition to post-Fordism. Nor should one treat each of these trends as a singular causal mechanism in its own right and thereby neglect their essentially descriptive, synthetic and generalized character. Nor do they entail any unidirec- tional movement or multilateral convergence across all national regimes; instead, they can take different empirical forms. First, there is a general trend towards the denationalization of the state (or, better, statehood). This structural trend is reflected empirically in the 'hollowing out' of the national state apparatus with old and new state capacities being reorganized territorially and functionally on sub-national, national, supranational and trans-local levels. There is a continuing movement of state power upwards, downwards and side- ways as attempts are made by state managers on different territorial scales to enhance their respective operational autonomies and strategic capacities. One aspect of this is the loss of the de jure sovereignty of national states in certain respects as rule- and/or decision-making powers are transferred upwards to supranational bodies and the resulting rules and decisions bind national states. This trend is most apparent in the European Union but also affects NAFTA and other inter- governmental regional blocs (cf. Mann, this journal). Another aspect is devolution of authority to subordinate levels of territorial organization and the development of transnational but inter-local policy making. Howrever, countering this trend is the survival of the national state as the principal factor of social cohesion in societies and its associated role in promoting social redistribution. TTLis trend should not be mistaken, pace Shaw (this journal), for the rise of a 'global state' - at least if the concept of state is to retain its core meaning of the territorialization of a centralized political authority and a 'global state' is thus equivalent to a single 'world state'. Instead, this trend represents a rearticulation of different levels of the territorial organization of power within the global political system. It is by no means limited to a loss of authority to supranational bodies or a rein- vigorated and relatively unchallenged American superstate with capacities to project its power on a global scale. It also involves the dele- gation of authority to subordinate levels of territorial organization and/or the development of so-called 'intermestic'9 (or interlocal but transnationalized) policy-making regimes In addition, as I note below, state power has become less important in key respects in contemporary capitalism - as governance has become more important. Moreover, even were a world state to exist, it would be prey to a tension between the juridico-political claim to unicity (sovereignty) and the reality of plurality (particularistic competition among other states for influence in its counsels). It is for this reason that inter-state politics on a global scale is marked by the international hegemony of a national state which seeks to develop a hegemonic political strategy for the global system - with that hegemony armoured, of course, by various forms of coercion and resting on a complex articulation of governmental powers and other forms of governance. Second, there is a trend towards the destatization of the political system. This is reflected in a shift from government to governance on various territorial scales and across various functional domains. There is a movement from the central role of official state apparatus in securing state-sponsored economic and social projects and political hegemony towards an emphasis on partnerships between governmental, para-governmental and non-governmental organizations in which the state apparatus is often only first among equals. This involves the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence. Governments have always relied on other agencies to aid them in realizing state objec- tives or projecting state power beyond the formal state apparatus. But this reliance has been reordered and increased. The relative weight of governance has increased on all levels - including not only at the supranational and local or regional levels but also in the trans- territorial and inter-local fields. Nonetheless, this can enhance their capacity to project state power and achieve state objectives by mobiliz- ing knowledge and power resources from influential non-governmental partners or stakeholders. Countering the shift towards governance is government's increased role in meta-governance. Political authorities (at national and other levels) are more involved in organizing the self-organization of partnerships, networks and governance regimes. They provide the ground rules for governance; ensure the compatibility of different governance mechan- isms and regimes; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive expectations; act as a 'court of appeal' for disputes arising within and over gover- nance; seek to re-balance power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities and interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strate- gies and tactics; and also assume political responsibility in the event of governance failure. This emerging meta-governance role means that the forms of networking, negotiation, noise reduction and negative coordi- nation characteristic of governance take place 'in the shadow of hierarchy' (cf. Scharpf, 1994: 40; Hodgson, 1988: 220-8). Third, there is a dual trend towards the internationalization of policy regimes. The international context of domestic state action has extended to include a widening range of extra-territorial or transnational factors and processes; and it has become more significant strategically for domestic policy. The key players in policy regimes have also expanded to include foreign agents and institutions as sources of policy ideas, policy design and implementation (cf. Gourevitch, 1978; Doern et al., 1996). This trend is reflected in economic and social policies as the state becomes more concerned with 'international competitiveness' in the widest sense (cf. my earlier comments on Schumpeterian workfarism). Neoliberalism is the most obvious and vocal manifestation of this trend; but its long-term social impact is also proving the most disastrous. Somewhat ambiguously countering yet reinforcing this trend is a growring 'interiorization' of international constraints as these become integrated into the policy paradigms and cognitive models of domestic policy makers (on interiorization, see, for example, Poulantzas, 1975). These three changes do not exclude a continuing and central political role for the national state. But it is a role which is redefined as a result of the more general rearticulation of the local, regional, national and supranational levels of economic and political organization. Unless or until supra-national political organization acquires not only govern- mental powers but also some measure of popular-democratic legitimacy, the nLational state will remain a key political factor as the highest instance of bourgeois democratic political accountability. How it plays this role will depend on the changing institutional matrix and shifts in the balance of forces as globalization, triadization, regionalization and the resur- gence of local governance proceed apace. As noted above, perhaps the most important role for the national state in this context is that of meta- governance, i.e. coordinating different forms of governance and ensuring a minimal coherence among them. In this sense Shaw is right to claim (this issue) that the national state core to governance will not go away. But this core will be less governmental and more oriented to issues of meta-governance. But one should note that there is no point at which any final meta-governance instance can be established to coordinate myriad subordinate forms of governance: this would reintroduce the principle of sovereignty or hierarchy which growing social complexity and globalization now rule out.