Company D has decided to introduce a new video game. To build the game, it has a choice of two technologies. The first (technology A) is publicly available and has cost function ca(q)=10+8q. The second (technology B) is proprietary, known only to Company D, and has cost function is cb(q)=60+2q. Market demand is P=20Q, where Q is total output of the industry (which may just be Company D, in the case of monopoly). (a) If Company D has a monopoly, which technology should they adopt? What will be their profit in this case? What is consumer surplus in this case? Now suppose that Company E has access to the publicly available technology. You may assume Cournot competition. (b) If Company D adopts technology A and Company E enters the market, what is the Cournot equilibrium? What will be the profit of each firm? Would Company E choose to enter the market given these profits? (c) If Company D adopts technology B and Company E enters the market, what is the Cournot equilibrium? What will be the profit of each firm? Would Company E choose to enter the market given these profits? (d) Given the previous two answers, which technology should Company D adopt? What will be Company D's profit in this case? What is the consumer surplus in this case? Compare the consumer surplus to part (a). Company D has decided to introduce a new video game. To build the game, it has a choice of two technologies. The first (technology A) is publicly available and has cost function ca(q)=10+8q. The second (technology B) is proprietary, known only to Company D, and has cost function is cb(q)=60+2q. Market demand is P=20Q, where Q is total output of the industry (which may just be Company D, in the case of monopoly). (a) If Company D has a monopoly, which technology should they adopt? What will be their profit in this case? What is consumer surplus in this case? Now suppose that Company E has access to the publicly available technology. You may assume Cournot competition. (b) If Company D adopts technology A and Company E enters the market, what is the Cournot equilibrium? What will be the profit of each firm? Would Company E choose to enter the market given these profits? (c) If Company D adopts technology B and Company E enters the market, what is the Cournot equilibrium? What will be the profit of each firm? Would Company E choose to enter the market given these profits? (d) Given the previous two answers, which technology should Company D adopt? What will be Company D's profit in this case? What is the consumer surplus in this case? Compare the consumer surplus to part (a)