Consider a market with the market demand D: P = 100 - Q, which is served by two Cournot duopolistic producers with the constant marginal cost MC = $10 and no fixed cost.

• In Nash equilibrium, the output of each firm, is
• 20
• 30
• 40
• 50

• In Nash equilibrium, the market output is
• 40
• 60
• 80
• 100

• In Nash equilibrium, the market price is
• $30
• $40
• $50
• $60

• In Nash equilibrium, profit of each firm is
• $900
• $1000
• $1100
• $1200

• When these two firms collude to form a cartel, the market output is
• 10
• 20
• 35
• 45

• When these two firms collude to form a cartel, the market price is
• 45
• 55
• 60
• 70

• When these two firms collude to form a cartel, the profit of each firm is
• $1012.50
• $1450.50
• $1560.25
• $1860.25

• Under pure competition a large number of identical firms in this market would produce a market output of
• 80
• 90
• 100
• 110

• Under pure competition the market price in this market would be
• $10
• $14
• $15
• $18