Consider the following extensive-form game. Note that two nodes of Player 2 are in the same information set. Also, note that Player 2's choosing b ends the game immediately if Player 1 chooses A at the initial node. On the other hand, Player 2's choosing b continues the play of the game if Player 1 choose B at the initial node. (3, 0) D -(-1,0) b . (2, 2) (5,5) B E (-2,0) b 1 F - (1, 8) (a) Give the strategic-form of the game. (Note that player 1 has eight pure strategies, and player 2 has two pure strategies.) Also, find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the strategic-form. (b) Identify all subgames of the extensive-form. Also, find all pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria