(*) Consider the following game of price formation between a buyer and a seller: (Bjuyer makes a ((ow) m(edium) or a h(igh) price offer to a (S)eller. S can only distinguish between a h and a not-high offer, which she can either a (ccept) or r(eject). If she accepts, trade occurs at the stated price. The corresponding payoffs are shown below. The payoff rejection and no-trade are normalized to zero. (3, 0) S (0, 0) (2, 1) B (0, 0) h (1, 2) S (0, 0) Figure 4. Bargaining Game. a. There is a Nash equilibrium of this game in which trade does not occur. b. Trade must occur if we solve this game via backward induction. c. It is not a valid extensive form, hence it cannot be solved. d. In a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of this game trade must occur