Consider the following game: There is a team of 2 members working on a project. Every member can give either a small (25%), medium (50%), or large (100%) effort; which they view as a cost to themselves of $50, $100, or $200 respectively and individually. The total revenue generated by the project is twice the sum total effort (percentages converted into dollars). The incentive structure is such that the first member gets 60% of the total revenue. While the second member gets 40% of the revenue if the revenue is above $401. (Otherwise 40% of revenue is "lost") (i) Organize this problem into a formal game: identify the strategy sets and payoff functions of each play- er. (ii) Is there a dominant strategy for player 1, player 2, both, or neither? Defend your answer with two proofs (one for each player). Is there a dominant strategy equilibrium? Explain why briefly. (iii) Is there a pure Nash equilibrium? If yes, find them all, and motivate and defend one of them. If no explain why briefly