. Consider the following public goods game. A group has 4 members. Each group member i is endowed with 10 tokens and chooses to allocate ; tokens (x; is an integer between 0 and 10) out of the 10 tokens to a public account and (10 x;) to a private account. The total number of tokens in the public account is the summation of the tokens allocated by all group members. Each token from the public account gives 50 cents as a return to each group member, and each token from the private account gives a full return of $1 to the 1 group member who owns it. The payoff for each player is the total payoft from the public account and the private account. (40 points) pecify what are the players, strategies, and the payoffs of the game. Write down the payoff function for player i. (2) Is there any dominant strategy of this game? Why? (3) Solve all the Nash equilibria of the game. (4) What is the efficient outcome of the game? Is it one of the equilibrium outcome(s)? If not, explain why the efficient outcome cannot be achieved