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Consider the following two-person game; player 1's pure strategies are T and B and player 2's pure strategies are L and R. Player 2 L
Consider the following two-person game; player 1's pure strategies are T and B and player 2's pure strategies are L and R.
Player 2
L R
Player 1T(0, 3)(2, 1)
B(3, 3)(0, 5)
Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Assume player 1 chooses T with probability p and chooses B with probability 1-p; player 2 chooses L with probability q and chooses R with probability 1-q.
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