Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) (0.5 marks) Suppose z = 4 and y=5. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? b) (0.5 marks) Suppose z=4 and y=5. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? c) (1 marks) Suppose z = 4 and y=5. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? d) (0.5 marks) Suppose = 4 and y=10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? 4 e) (0.5 marks) Suppose 4 and y=10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? f) (1 marks) Suppose z = 4 and y=10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? Player 2 Player 1 a b C d e 0,0 x, y x, 3 -2,4 f 3,5 0,7 4,0 0,5 9 1,6 4, y 2,1 0,7 h -3,3 10,5 -4,-2 -7,3