Consider the resale market for sneakers.There are two distinct markets for sneakers; buyers will pay up to $600 for a high-quality pair or $100 for a low-quality pair. There are 50 high-quality pairs of sneakers for sale, and the sellers have a minimum acceptable price of $500. There are also 50 low-quality pairs for sale at a minimum acceptable price of $50. The supply of sneakers is perfectly inelastic above the reservation price. a) If there is perfect information, how many high-quality and how many low-quality sneakers will be sold? b) Suppose that a seller knows the quality of a pair of sneakers, but a buyer does not. What price will prevail in the market- place if buyers correctly estimate the chance of acquiring a low-quality sneaker at 50%? What happens to the number of high-quality sneakers for sale at that price? c) After sellers make all adjustments, what will the equilibrium price of sneakers be? What proportion of sneakers sold will be of high quality? d) What is the minimum market share of high-quality sneakers that would be required for the presence of asymmetric information to have no impact on the efficiency of the sneaker resale market (compared to the full information benchmark)?