Could i get the answers for bi bii biii

W AutoSave Off abc NBS-5102A-AUG-ODR-V2 v Search (Alt+Q) Alwin Jacob AJ X File Home Insert Draw Design Layout References Mailings Review View Help Table Design Layout Comments Share Find Aria * 12 ~ A" A Aa Ap Normal No Spacing Heading 1 Replace Paste Heading 2 BI Uvab x x A LA Dictate Sensitivity Editor Select v Undo Clipboard Font Paragraph Styles Editing Voice Sensitivity Editor 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 1 2 . | 3 1. 4 1 . 51 1 . . 1 7 . 1 8 . . 9 . 10 1 . 10 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . I . 1 . I . I . I Question 3 (a) Consider the following one-shot game. Firm B Low price High Price Firm A Low price 200, 200 400, 150 High price 150, 400 300, 300 (i) What type of game is this? [1 mark] (ii) Define the concept of Nash equilibrium [1 mark] (i) Reproduce the game in your response and use best response analysis to find the Nash Equilibria of this game. [4 marks] (b) Suppose now that the game in part (a) is played an infinite number of times. Both firms realise that collectively they would be better off setting a high price. Firms may be able to establish cooperation using various strategies. (i) Define what is meant by grim trigger and tit-for-tat strategies. [4 marks] Page 5 of 12 2403 words CX Text Predictions: On x Accessibility: Investigate " Focus + 100% : 21'C O O P 11:54 Rain off and on 16/08/2022W AutoSave Off abc NBS-5102A-AUG-ODR-V2 v Search (Alt+Q) Alwin Jacob AJ X File Home Insert Draw Design Layout References Mailings Review View Help Table Design Layout Comments Share * 12 ~ A" A" Aa Ap Find Aria Normal No Spacing Paste Heading 1 Heading 2 Replace BI U~ ab x x A LA Dictate Sensitivity Editor Select v Undo Clipboard Font Paragraph Styles Editing Voice Sensitivity Editor 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . I . I M . 1 . 1 . 1 1 2 . 1 3 . 1. 4 1 . 51 1 .. 1 7 . 1 8 . 1 9 . . 10 1 . 10 1 . 1 . 1 . I . I . I . I . I . I me Nash Equilibria Of THIS game. (4 marks] (b) Suppose now that the game in part (a) is played an infinite number of times. Both firms realise that collectively they would be better off setting a high price. Firms may be able to establish cooperation using various strategies. (i) Define what is meant by grim trigger and tit-for-tat strategies. [4 marks] (ii) Suppose Firm B is able to credibly commit to a Grim Trigger Strategy. Calculate the discount factor o such that Firm A cooperates. [6 marks] (iii) Suppose Firm B, instead commits to a tit-for-tat strategy. Calculate the discount factor o necessary such that Firm A cooperates. [4 marks] Total: 20 marks Page 5 of 12 2403 words CX Text Predictions: On fox Accessibility: Investigate " Focus + 100% : 21'C OW x P 11:55 Rain off and on 16/08/2022