Could you help me to figure out question 1.3? Coz i don't know the value of c, I'm confused about how to make conclusion about the what should player B do. Thank you

F410:13 4A2BAD 46% a moodle.telt.unsw.edu.au 1/2 ECON2112 Game Theory & Business Strategy Problem Set 4 March 19, 2020 1 (For parts 4 and 6, graders will be lenient as you have not yet solved many games of incom- plete information. Yet, they will expect you to try your absolute best, and provide at least a reasoning behind your answer) There are two players, A and B. Each player i E {A, B} can be of one of two types to E {1, 2}. The probability that a player is of type 2 equals 7. When A and B meet, each can decide to fight or cave. If both players fight, then player i gets payoff ti titt; - - c, ji where c > 0. If player i fights, but player j does not, then player i gets payoff 1, while player j gets payoff 0. If both players do not fight, each gets payoff 1/2