Economics Two firms, one in Spain and the other in France, act as Cou rnot competitors in supplying mussels to England. Mussels are a homogeneous good and the inverse demand for mussels in England is given by p = 100 E 36), where Q is the total quantity supplied. The marginal cost of each firm (including shipping) is 10 and fixed costs are zero. (a) [15 marks] Calculate the Cournot equilibrium quantities and the profits of the two firms. (b) [20 marks] Now the French government agrees to subsidise French mussel producers at a level of 5 per unit. Recalculate the Cournot equilibrium and compare it to the equilibrium in part (i). Explain, using a diagram, the intuition for this result. (c) [15 marks] Derive the optimal subsidy that the French government should introduce to maximise French welfare (i.e. the profit ofthe French firm minus the cost of the subsidy)