EEOC V$.$ Abercromble & Fitch, $575$ U$.$S$..$: $135$ s$.$ Ct$.2028(2015)$A $17-$year$-$old interviewed for a position at Abercrombie & Fitch clothing store wearing a headscarf. Her interviewer was impressed with the applicant but mentioned to the manager that the applicant wore a scarf and that she thought the scarf was for religious reasons. The district manager said their policy did not permit wearing "caps" and declined to hire her. The applicant sued for religious discrimination and won. The Court determined that Title VIl's prohibition on the employer to not discriminate in employment on the basis of religion to the extent it did not cause an undue hardship applied even though the applicant did not inform the employer of the need for accommodation.Scalla, J$.$Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., operates several lines of clothing stores, each with its own "style." Consistent with the image Abercrombie seeks to project for each store, the company imposes a Look Policy that governs its employees' dress. The Look Policy prohibits "caps"a term the Policy does not define$-$as too informal for Abercrombie's desired image.Samantha Elauf is a practicing Muslim who, consistent with her understanding of her religion's requirements, wears a headscarf. She applied for a position in an Abercrombie store, and was interviewed by Heather Cooke, the store's assistant manager. Using Abercrombie's ordinary system for evaluating applicants, Cooke gave Elauf a rating that qualified her to be hired; Cooke was concerned, however, that Elauf's headscarf would conflict with the store's Look Policy.Cooke sought the store manager's guidance to clarify whether the headscarf was a forbidden "cap." When this yielded no answer, Cooke turned to Randall Johnson, the district manager. Cooke informed Johnson that she believed Elauf wore her headscarf because of her faith. Johnson told Cooke that Elauf's headscarf would violate the Look Policy, as would all other headwear, religious or otherwise, and directed Cooke not to hire Elauf.The EEOC sued Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf, claiming that its refusal to hire Elauf violated Title VII. Abercrombie's primary argument is that an applicant cannot show disparate treatment without first showing that an employer has "actual knowledge" of the applicant's need for an accommodation. We disagree. Instead, an applicant need only show that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision.The rule for disparate treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions. For example, suppose that an employer thinks $($though he does not know for certain$)$ that a job applicant may be an orthodox Jew who will observe the Sabbath, and thus be unable to work on Saturdays. If the applicant actually requires an accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer's desire to avoid the prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the employer violates Title VII.A request for accommodation, or the employer's certainty that the practice exists, may make it easier to infer motive, but is not a necessary condition of liability. Reversed and remanded. Provide sufficient information to give me the impression that you are well informed on the subject. "Complete but concise" is a good guide.Case Questions

Do you understand the Court's reasoning? Explain.

If you were the employer who was not told of the religious conflict but you were held responsible for it$,$ how would you feel?

Is question $2$ really a fair question if the employer even suspected that the scarf may have been for religious reasons? Do you understand why it would make no difference under the law if the employer knew or did not know? Explain.