f. Suppose that the price of one permit is equal to $150. How many permits will be exchanged? What would be the production levels of Chemtraa'e and Marsulex after the trade of permits? g. Does this policy lead to a Pareto improvement over the cap? Does it lead to an efficient allocation? Explain in less than ten lines. Suppose now that instead of being constant, the marginal external costs (ME Cs ) are identical increasing functions of Q. h. Is the total external cost (THC) higher, the same, or lower when there is a production cap at 150 tons of sulfuric acid (with 75 tons going to each firm) compared to when Chemtrade and Marsulex. are allowed to trade the production permits amongst themselves? Explain. [Even though graphs are not necessary to answer this question, you may find it helpful to draw two graphs similar to the graph that you drew in part b., one with a constantMEC and one with an increasing MEG] i. In the presence of increasing MEC, does allowing firms to trade permits lead to a Pareto efficient allocation? Explain