For the following extensive form game, draw out the game in a separate piece of paper. Terrorist Act / Violence Group Repression '____-" Repress Negotiate Government Negotiate Good Faith Negotiations The preference ordering for the True Believers: o Terrorist act > Good faith negotiations > Being repressed. The preference ordering for the Reluctant Terrorists: o Good faith negotiations > Terrorist act > Being repressed. The preference ordering for the Repressive Government: o Repression > Good faith negotiations > Terrorist act. The preference ordering for the Responsive Government: o Good faith negotiations > Repression > Terrorist act. Draw the game tree for the Terrorism Game with the social group True Believers and a Repressive Government. Using the preference orderings shown above, write in the appropriate payoffs for each possible outcome. Use the numbers 3, 2, and 1 to indicate the preference ordering for the players. Solve the game using backward induction. What is the expected outcome of the game? () True Believers choose violence and the Repressive Government represses () Repression () Terrorist act () Good Faith Negotiations Continuing with the game you drew and solved for question 22 involving the social group True Believers and a Repressive Government. What is the expected payoff of the game? ()(22) ()(33) () (31) O Continuing with the game you drew and solved for question 22 involving the social group True Believers and a Repressive Government. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? () (negotiate; repress) () (violence; negotiate) () (negotiate; negotiate) (violence; repress) () (violence)