Game theory related

1. (3019755) There are two risk neutral individuals (2' = 1, 2) interested in purchasing an indivisible object. The ex post value of the object to either individual is v = x1 + :02, where the components x1 and x2 are the realizations of 2'.in random variables uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Individual 2' privately observes :13,- for z' = 1, 2. Suppose the object is to be sold via a rstprice auction with no reserve price or entry fee. Let b(-) be a symmetric, increasing, differentiable BNE bidding function with inverse gb(-). A. From individual 1's perspective, what is the expected value of :32 if she wins by submitting a bid of when individual 2 bids according to b(-)? B. What is individual 1's interim expected utility from bidding 6 when individual 2 bids according to b(-)? C. Find b(:r) . What is expected equilibrium revenue. U