HW help, if you can. Thank you!

A small tourist town has two Italian restaurants, Romano's (R) and Giardino's (G). Normally, both restaurants prosper with no advertising. It seems possible that Romano's could take some of Giardino's customers by running radio ads and Giardino's could do the same thing. The one month profit matrix (showing payoffs in thousands of dollars) is shown to the right. However, suppose that each firm gets 4 if it advertises and the other R firm does not. What is the Nash equilibrium in the static (one month) game? No Ads Advertise O A. The Nash equilibria are for both restaurants to not advertise and for both restaurants to advertise. 7 4 O B. The Nash equilibrium is for both restaurants to advertise. No Ads O C. This game has no Nash equilibria. 7 O D. The Nash equilibrium is for both restaurants to not advertise. G O E. The Nash equilibria are for one restaurant to advertise and the other to not advertise. 0 3 If the game is repeated indefinitely, can the use of tit-for-tat strategies result in a Nash equilibrium? Advertise 4 3 If the game is repeated indefinitely, then a tit-for-tat strategy should result in O A. Romano's advertising and Giardino's not advertising. O B. both restaurants not advertising. O C. both restaurants advertising. O D. Romano's not advertising and Giardino's advertising. O E. both restaurants not advertising or both restaurants advertising. Does the dame have multiple equilibria if the dame is repeated indefinitely