i. We define the 'bourgeois' strategy, s. as follows: s. (player i arrived first) = H, s? (player -i arrived first) = D. Suppose players are playing according to ($1, $2). Let's see when this strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) by con- sidering whether player i can benefit by deviating at any element of her partition. . In this strategy profile, what action does player i take when she arrives first? What is her payoff? Can she benefit by taking the alternative action in this element of her partition? . What action does player i's take when she arrives second? What is her payoff? Can she benefit by taking the alternative action in this element of her partition? . How do these results depend on ? ii. Define the strategy in which player i always plays hawk as s, (mi) = H for all mi Elli, and the strategy in which player i always plays dove as s. (mi) = D for all mi E IIi. Show that (sh, so) and (sd, 1, $2 ) are also equilibria of this Bayesian game