I'm having trouble with these questions.

10 * W CO What wage would the union choose if it behaved as a "monopoly union"? What amount of employment would the firm choose in response? Is this outcome on the contract curve? Answer: TTo A W Submit Answer N TT 2 MRPL * O 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Name an outcome which is a Pareto improvement over the L monopoly union outcome. Name an outcome which is Pareto efficient. Answer: If the alternative wage is $3, is this union maximizing the wage bill or economic rent? Answer: Submit Answer * Submit Answer Suppose the alternative wage is $7 and the firm and union bargain within a right-to-manage framework. Is the union's preferred outcome within the bargaining range? Answer: Submit Answer141 W 13 A The product of gains at point A is _. Find another feasible outcome 12 which has higher product of gains than this. Find another feasible 11 outcome which has lower product of gains than this. Is it possible that A is the Nash solution? 10 Answer: Submit Answer * 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 L Suppose there will be two rounds of Rubinstein bargaining. How will the feasible set look in the second round if there are delay costs? If there is full information, in which round will agreement be reached? Answer: At the threat point, the union has payoff and the firm has payoff . At outcome A, the union's gain is and the firm's gain is Answer: Submit Answer Submit