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Board of Education of Pottawa'lomle County v. Earls {2M2} Justice Thomas delivered the opinion ofthe Conn. The Student Activities DnJg Testing Policy implemented by the Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County (School District} requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to dn.rg testing. Because this Policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students. we hold that it is constitutional. The city of Tecumseh. Oklahoma. is a rural community located approximately 4:] miles southeast of Oklahoma City. The School District administers all Tecumseh public schools. In the fall of 1993. the School District adopted the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy [Policy]. which requires all middle and high school students to consent to drug testing in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. In practice. the Policy has been applied only to competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by the l[lultlahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association. such as the Academic Team. Future Farmers of America. Future Homemakers of America. band. choir. pom pon. cheerleading. and athletics. Under the Policy. students are required to take a drug test before participating in an extracurricular activity. must submit to random drug testing while participating in that activity. and must agree to be tested at any time upon reasonable suspicion. The urinalysis tests are designed to detect only the use of illegal drugs. including amphetamines. marijuana. cocaine. opiates. and barbituates. not medical conditions or the presence of authorized prescription medications. At the time oftheir suit. both respondents attended Tecumseh High School. Respondent Lindsay Earls was a member of the show choir. the marching band. the Academic Team. and the National Honor Society. Respondent Daniel James sought to participate in the Academic Team. Together with their parents. Earls and James brought a 42 U. S. C. 1QBS action against the School District. challenging the Policy both on its. face and as applied to their participation in extracurricular activities. They alleged that the Policy violates the Fourth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and request injunctive and declarative relief. They also argued that the School District failed to idemify a special need for testing students who participate in extracurricular activities. and that the "Drug Testing Policy neither addresses a proven problem nor prom'ees to bring any benet to students or the school." Applying the principles articulated in Vemonie School Dist. 41.! v. Acton {1995]. in which we upheld the suspicionless dnJg testing of school athletes. the United States District Court for the II.I"l"estern District of Dklahoma rejected respondents' claim that the Policy was unconstitutional and granted summary judgment to the School District. The court noted that 'special needs' exist in the public school context and that. although the School District did 'not sho'vlI a drug problem of epidemic proportions." there was a history of drug abuse starting in 1am that presented "legitimate cause for concern.'. The District Court also held that the Policy was effective because "[i]t can scarcely be disputed that the drug problem among the student body is effectively addressed by making sure that the large number of students participating in competitive. extracurricular activities do not use dnlgs.\" The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. holding that the Policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the Policy must be evaluated in the "unique environment of the school setting.' but reached a different conclusion as to the Policy's constitutionality. Before imposing a suspicionless dnJg testing program. the Court of Appeals concluded that a school "must demonstrate that there is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the testing. such that testing that group of students will actually redress its. drug problem.' The Court of Appeals then held that because the School District failed to demonstrate such a problem existed among Tecumseh students participating in competitive extracurricular activities. the Policy was unconstitutional. 'IAI'e granted certiorari (2001]. and now reverse. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Searches by public school officials, such as the collection of urine samples, implicate Fourth Amendment interests. See Vernonia,; cf. New Jersey v. T. L. O. (1985). We must therefore review the School District's Policy for "reasonableness," which is the touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental search. In the criminal context, reasonableness usually requires a showing of probable cause... The probable- cause standard, however, "is peculiarly related to criminal investigations" and may be unsuited to determining the reasonableness of administrative searches where the "Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions." ... The Court has also held that a warrant and finding of probable cause are unnecessary in the public school context because such requirements " would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed." ...Respondents instead arque that drug testing must be based at least on some level of individualized suspicion. It is true that we generally determine the reasonableness of a search by balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. See Delaware v. Prouse, (1979). But we have long held that "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized] suspicion." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, (1976). "[In certain limited circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion." Therefore, in the context of safety and administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable "when `special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' Significantly, this Court has previously held that "special needs" inhere in the public school context. See Vernonia, T. L O. While schoolchildren do not shed their constitutional rights when they enter the schoolhouse..."Fourth Amendment rights ... are different in public schools than elsewhere; the reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children." Vernonia. In particular, a finding of individualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school conducts drug testing. We first consider the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the drug testing... A student's privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety. Schoolchildren are routinely required to submit to physical examinations and vaccinations against disease. Securing order in the school environment sometimes requires that students be subjected to greater controls than those appropriate for adults. See T. L. O., Powell, J., concurring) ("Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has prompted national concern"). Next, we consider the character of the intrusion imposed by the Policy.... Under the Policy, a faculty monitor waits outside the closed restroom stall for the student to produce a sample and must "listen for the normal sounds of urination in order to guard against tampered specimens and to insure an accurate chain of custody." The monitor then pours the sample into two bottles that are sealed and placed into a mailing pouch along with a consent form signed by the student. This procedure is virtually identical to that reviewed in Vernonia, except that it additionally protects privacy by allowing male students to produce their samples behind a closed stall. Given that we considered the method of collection in Vernonia a "negligible" intrusion, the method here is even less problematic.In addition, the Policy clearly requires that the test results be kept in confidential files separate from a student's other educational records and released to school personnel only on a "need to know" basis. Respondents nonetheless contend that the intrusion on students' privacy is significant because the Policy fails to protect effectively against the disclosure of confidential information and, specifically, that the school "has been careless in protecting that information: for example, the Choir teacher looked at students' prescription drug lists and left them where other students could see them But the choir teacher is someone with a "need to know," because during off-campus trips she needs to know what medications are taken by her students. Even before the Policy was enacted the choir teacher had access to this information. In any event, there is no allegation that any other student did see such information. This one example of alleged carelessness hardly increases the character of the intrusion. Moreover, the test results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results here lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic consequences. Rather, the only consequence of a failed drug test is to limit the student's privilege of participating in extracurricular activities. Indeed, a student may test positive for drugs twice and still be allowed to participate in extracurricular activities. After the first positive test, the school contacts the student's parent or guardian for a meeting. The student may continue to participate in the activity if within five days of the meeting the student shows proof of receiving drug counseling and submits to a second drug test in two weeks. For the second positive test, the student is suspended from participation in all extracurricular activities for 14 days, must complete four hours of substance abuse counseling, and must submit to monthly drug tests. Only after a third positive test will the student be suspended from participating in any extracurricular activity for the remainder of the school year, or 88 school days, whichever is longer. Given the minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the limited uses to which the test results are put, we conclude that the invasion of students' privacy is not significant Finally, this Court must consider the nature and immediacy of the government's concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting them... ...Given the nationwide epidemic of drug use, and the evidence of increased drug use in Tecumseh schools, it was entirely reasonable for the School District to enact this particular drug testing policy. We reject the Court of Appeals' novel test that "any district seeking to impose a random suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition to participation in a school activity must demonstrate that there is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the testing, such that testing that group of students will actually redress its drug problem." Among other problems, it would be difficult to administer such a test. As we cannot articulate a threshold level of drug use that would suffice to justify a drug testing program for schoolchildren, we refuse to fashion what would in effect be a constitutional quantum of drug use necessary to show a "drug problem." Finally, we find that testing students who participate in extracurricular activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use. While in Vernonia there might have been a closer fit between the testing of athletes and the trial court's finding that the drug problem was "fueled by the "role model' effect of athletes' drug use," such a finding was not essential to the holding... Vernonia did not require the school to test the group of students most likely to use drugs, but rather considered the constitutionality of the program in the context of the public school's custodial responsibilities. Evaluating the Policy in this context, we conclude that the drug testing of Tecumseh students who participate in extracurricular activities effectively serves the School District's interest in protecting the safety and health of its students. Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.It is so ordered. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting. I dissented in Vernonia v. Acton (1995), and continue to believe that case was wrongly decided. Because Vernonia is now this Court's precedent, and because I agree that petitioners' program fails even under the balancing approach adopted in that case, I join Justice Ginsburg's dissent. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Souter join, dissenting. Seven years ago, in Vernonia this Court determined that a school district's policy of randomly testing the urine of its student athletes for illicit drugs did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that drug use "increase[dj the risk of sports-related injury" and that Vernonia's athletes were the "leaders" of an aggressive local "drug culture" that had reached " "epidemic proportions.' ". Today, the Court relies upon Vernonia to permit a school district with a drug problem its superintendent repeatedly described as "not ... major," to test the urine of an academic team member solely by reason of her participation in a nonathletic, competitive extracurricular activity--participation associated with neither special dangers from, nor particular predilections for, drug use. "[The legality of a search of a student," this Court has instructed, "should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." New Jersey v. T. L O., (1985). Although ""special needs' inhere in the public school context," those needs are not so expansive or malleable as to render reasonable any program of student drug testing a school district elects to install. The particular testing program upheld today is not reasonable, it is capricious, even perverse: Petitioners' policy targets for testing a student population least likely to be at risk from illicit drugs and their damaging effects. I therefore dissent. .. Vernonia applied, it did not repudiate, the principle that "the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." T. L. O., (emphasis added). Enrollment in a public school, and election to participate in school activities beyond the bare minimum that the curriculum requires, are indeed factors relevant to reasonableness, but they do not on their own justify intrusive, suspicionless searches. Vernonia, accordingly, did not rest upon these factors; instead, the Court performed what today's majority aptly describes as a "fact-specific balancing,". Balancing of that order, applied to the facts now before the Court, should yield a result other than the one the Court announces today... -.this case resembles Vernonia only in that the School Districts in both cases conditioned engagement in activities outside the obligatory curriculum on random subjection to urinalysis. The defining characteristics of the two programs, however, are entirely dissimilar. The Vernonia district sought to test a subpopulation of students distinguished by their reduced expectation of privacy, their special susceptibility to drug- related injury, and their heavy involvement with drug use. The Tecumseh district seeks to test a much larger population associated with none of these factors. It does so, moreover, without carefully safeguarding student confidentiality and without regard to the program's untoward effects. A program so sweeping is not sheltered by Vernonia; its unreasonable reach renders it impermissible under the Fourth Amendment... ...It is a sad irony that the petitioning School District seeks to justify its edict here by trumpeting "the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.". In regulating an athletic program or endeavoring to combat an exploding drug epidemic, a school's custodial obligations may permit searches that would otherwise unacceptable abridge students' rights. When custodial duties are not ascendant, however, schools' tutelary obligations to their students require them to "teach by example" by avoiding symbolic measures that diminish constitutional protections. "That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not tostrangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."