In Bertrand price competition, the rms decide on the price that they will charge and the consumers buy from the rm with the lowest price. Another way to think about oligopolistic markets is Cournot competition. In this model, the rms decide how much to produce. Consider the following problem: Two rms simultaneously decide how much to produce. Each rm's factory is capable of producing outputs of 0, 2, 4, or 6. The cost of producing each unit is l. The price that prevails in the market depends on the total output from the two rms. In particular, the price for each unit is given by p = 13 (q1 + qz) where q 1 is rm 1's output and q 2 is rm 2's output. So, for example, if rm 1 produces 2 and rm 2 produces 4, the total output is 6 and the market price is l3-(2+4)=7 per unit. This gives rm 1 revenues of (7)(2)=l4; costs of (2)(l)=2; and prots of l4-2=12. Firm 2's revenues are 7(4)=28; its costs are 4; and its prots are 24. (a) Specify the strategic form for this game and solve it by iterated deletion of dominated strategies