In this question, we'll consider a version of the authority model where the principal works with two agents, each on a separate project. There is one principal who is in charge of two projects, i = 1, 2. The principal hires one agent for each project; we identify the agent associated with project i as Agent i. Each Agent i separately chooses eEort 21' to produce an idea for his own project 1'. Each Agent i's e'ort cost is is? . At the same time, the Principal P chooses effort levels E1 and E2 to devote to each project. Her total effort cost is :E1 + E2)2. The probability that Agent 1' produces an idea for Project i equals his effort 8;. The probability that P produces an idea for Project 1' equals E,. For Project 1: if the Principal's idea is implemented, then the Principal and Agent 1 both receive 1. Ingent 1's idea is implemented, then the principal receives 0