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Information Asymmetry (Adverse Selection) Suppose there is a market for used cars whereby the cars can be divided into three categories based on their quality.

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Information Asymmetry (Adverse Selection) Suppose there is a market for used cars whereby the cars can be divided into three categories based on their quality. Cars of high quality, C1, have a value of V, = $10,000. Cars of average quality, C2, have a value of V2 = $5,000. Finally, some used cars are of poor quality ("lemons"), C3, and have a value of V3 = $0. The percentage of high quality cars available in the market is 30%, while 40% consists of average quality cars, and 30% are of poor quality. Assume that both buyers and sellers are risk neutral. Further assume that the buyers know the quality distribution of the overall market, but only the sellers know the true quality of any individual used car. a. What is the expected value of a used car in the market, V? b. Explain and show numerically why the equilibrium price in the market for used cars will not represent the expected value, P # V. C. What will be the equilibrium Price, P, for this market? Is this efficient? Why? d. Explain how the buyers or sellers may attempt to solve this problem. Information Asymmetry (Adverse Selection) Suppose there is a market for used cars whereby the cars can be divided into three categories based on their quality. Cars of high quality, C1, have a value of V, = $10,000. Cars of average quality, C2, have a value of V2 = $5,000. Finally, some used cars are of poor quality ("lemons"), C3, and have a value of V3 = $0. The percentage of high quality cars available in the market is 30%, while 40% consists of average quality cars, and 30% are of poor quality. Assume that both buyers and sellers are risk neutral. Further assume that the buyers know the quality distribution of the overall market, but only the sellers know the true quality of any individual used car. a. What is the expected value of a used car in the market, V? b. Explain and show numerically why the equilibrium price in the market for used cars will not represent the expected value, P # V. C. What will be the equilibrium Price, P, for this market? Is this efficient? Why? d. Explain how the buyers or sellers may attempt to solve this

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