it was 6 5 pm. Karen Jimenez was reviewing the notes on her teambased productivity project for what seemed like the hundredth time. to two days, she was scheduled to present a report to the senior management group on the project's progress. She wasn't at all sure what she was going to say. The project was designed to improve productivity and morale at each plant owned and operated by Acme Minerals Extraction Company. Phase one plemented in early 1995 at the site in wichita. Kansasilookcd like a stunning success by the middle of 1995. Productivity and morale soared. and operating and maintenance costs decreased signr icantly. But four months Jimenez tried to duplicate the results at the project's second mgclithc plant in Lubbock, Texasiand something went wrong. The techniques that had worked so well in wiehita met with only moderate success in Lubbock. Productivity improved marginally and costs went down a bit, but morale actually seemed to deteriorate slightly. Jimenez was stumped. She tried to \"helicopter up\" and think about the problem in the broad context ofthe company's history A few years ago, Acme had been in bad financial shape. but what had really brought things to a headiand had led to her current dilemmniwas a labor relations problem. Acme had a wide vanety of labor requirements for its operations. The company used highly sophisticated technology. employing geologists, geophysicists, and engineers on what was referred to as the \"brains\" side of the business, as well as skilled and semiskilled labor on the \"brawn\" side to rim the extraction operations, And in the summer of 1994. brains and brawn clashed in an embarrassingly public way. A number ofengineers at the Wichita plant locked several union workers out ofthe offices in loo-degree heat, Although most Acme employees now felt that the incident had been blown out ofproportion by the press. the board of directors had used the bad publicity as an excuse to push out an aging chief executive and bring in new blood in the form of Bill Daniels. The board had asked Daniels to lead the company in part because he came from a prominent management-consulting rm that was noted for its approach to teamwork and change, As it turned out, he had proved a good choice. Daniels was a handson, highenergy, charismatic businessman who seemed to enjoy media attention, Within his first year as CEO. he had pretty much righted the floundering company by selling off some unrelated lines cfbusiness. He had also created the sharedrservices depanmcnliau internal consulting organization providing change management, reengineering, total quality management, and other serviccsiafld had tapped Jimenez to head the group. Her first priority, Daniels told her. would be to iruprove productivity and morale at the company's five extraction sites. None of them were meeting their projections, And although Wichita was the only site at which the labofrmanagemcm conflict was painfully apparent, Daniels and Jimenez both thought that morale needed an all-around boost. Hence the teambased productivity projectAt the time, Jimenez felt up to the task. she hadjoined Acme in her late twenties with an MBA. and a few years at a wellknown consulting firm under her belt. She had been at the helm ofmore than a few successful change effort And in the ten years since she joined Acme, she had gained expenience in a number ofmidlevel positions. with a hardworking team of her own in tow, Jimt'mcz commenced work. first, she de dad on a battle plan. Por several reasons, wichita seemed ideal as an inaugural . Under the fomier cm the site had spent long periods of time n the market. The plant consistently imderperformed, and the old regime wanted to be rid of it. Periodically, frustrated by the lack of what he considered serious offers, the former CEO ordered improvement programs. which were always abandoned after a short time. Jimncz believed that |h' failures ofthose change programs were prcdictable: expectations had been unreal' tic, there had been little commitment from management. and the improvementproject team members had been given little authority to implement changes. As she considered her mission at Wichita, Jimenez was certain that her new political clout comb' 'd with her experience as a consultant would make the project manageable. Moreover, she reasoned that because many previous efforts had failed. her effons would look doubly good ifthe project succeeded. if it failed, the situation could be positioned with the proper spin as an intractable set of problems that no one could solve. The biggest problem at Wichita was clearly that labor and management didn'l get along. As a result costs to maintain the heavy equipment were significantly out of line with those incurred by other operations. Wichisz high fixed costs and razorthin margins meant that every dollar saved in maintenance was a dollar of profit. While operating costs were high. too. they weren't nearly as high as maintenance costs, Jimenez set about fixing the labor relations problem. And although things hadn't improved as smoothly or as quickly as she had hoped. Wichita was a great success. The problem was. Damels had wasted no time in touting the early successes to stakeholders. in fact. not long arf the Wichita project had gotten under way. he described it at great length in a speech to the Financial Analysls' Society on Wall Street. With characteris embellishment, he cited the project as a vision for the future ofAcmei deed, he called it the organization for the twenty-fast century. He all but told the analysts that the Wichita model would soon be rolled out through the entire enterprise, Jimenez had been furiousiand more than a little frightened. She didn't want her feet held to the re like that; she lorew that reproducing Wichiva's success might not be possible and that even if it were, it might not be accomplished in a cookie-cutter fashion, In fact she had tried to let Daniels know ofher feelings on more than a few occasions. long before he spouted off to Wall Street. She had met with him and sent him reports. Email, and memos. The message. it seemed. had fallen on deaf ears. Inside chit: Jimenez looked at the clock again: it was now .30. The 1.75 million project that could bring Acme into the twentyrust century was listing, she mused and so was her career. She looked at her computer screen for inspiration, but it was blank. Maybe if she reviewed the succ story once mo . She opened [ht 1e marked \"Wichita" and studied the workprocess flowchart. The site had been unexceptional in almost every way. There were three functional groups: operations, which cons ted ofhourly workers who operated and maintained the exhaction equipment; \"below gmnud." a group composed of engineers, geologists, and geophysicists who determined where and how to drill for the desired minerals; and \"above gxound,\" a group of engineers in charge of cursory refinement and hansportation of the minerals. Before the team project had been put in motion Wichita had shown little coordination or communication among these groups. Jimenez knew that she had had at least one stroke of good luck in Wichita in the form of David Keller. Keller, a 39year Acme veteran. had been looking for one last job before he retired. and he wanted it to be in Wichita, where his family had lived for 8 years earlier in his career. He wanted to retire there. Keller was widely respected in the company and Jimenez genuinely liked him. So. with the blessing ofDaniels and the other senior managers. she had appointed him project leader She smiled as she thought about Keller. He was a Korean War vet who had relocated several times for Acme. serving in just about every possible line and staffposition. He joined the company in 1957 and was immediately baptized in the dust and heat ofNorth Africa, where the company had set up operations soon after World War 11, Keller was a link to Acme's heady past, when it had thought nothing of clearing Allied land mines planted in the desert in its drive to expand. It struck Jimenez that Keller had joined the company before she was born, Jimenez thought about the Wichita projc's rough spots, One oftbem had been the institution ofa monthly \"problem chat," an optional meeting open to all staff to discuss unresolved problems. No one attended the fust one. She and Keller sat there nervously, together eating six doughnuts before she called a secretary and had them carted away. But over time, people began to show up, Aher about four month the meetings were wellatteuded, lively problemrsolving discussions that actually produced some improvements. In one case. a maintenance worker explained to afacilities engineer that one ofthe standard equipment configurations was failing as a result ofhigh levels of heat and sand contamination. resulting in occasional downtime, With Keller mediating, the complaint had been taken well. without the usual friction. The engineer easily fabricated a new configuration more itable to the conditions. and downtime was virtually eliminated. Such insights were common at the problem chats. Previously, no organizational mechanism had existed for capturing solutions or transferring them to other parts ofthe opeiation. Jimenez and Keller then introduced teams to \"StechI a problem and implement a tailored Solulion,\" or SPJTS. These were ad hoe groups made up ofmembcrs from each ofthe functional areas. The groups were formed to work on a specific project identified in a problem chat; they were disbanded when the problem was solved. it was the implementation of mm teams that led some eight months later to a wholesale reorganization ofthe Wichita work site. Jimenez believed that SPJTS had been abrealnhrough that had shown her how to boost productivity and mnfalcithf: goal that Daniels had set for her. The program had given cros functional teams of 12 to 15 people from operations, above ground, and below ground the responsib ty and authority to address problems as they occurred without seclring the approval of management. Jimenez reminded herselfthat even after SPJTS there were still some rocky moments in Wichita. Some engineers resented having to work the alongside operations personnel They told Keller, \"These miners don't understand why we do what we do." Likewise. some operations staff balked at having to work with engineers who \"kucw how to mine only on a computer screen." But one year into the pilot. things began to hum People weren't just working together. they were socializing together. At one of the problem chats. an operations worker jokingly suggested that the brains and the hiawn duke it out once aweek to get rid ofthe tensions. Keller jumped on the joke and had T-shms made that said brains and bmwn: he then challenged the groups to square offwcekly in a softball game. Early into the first game. a zoopound miner slammed into a thin, wiry engineer at home plate. and Jimenez. watching from the sidelines. was sure that her corporate change plan had just been called out. But the engineer simply dusted himself off, laughing and swearing at the same time. At the next game. the engineer showed up wearing knee and shoulder pads. and Jimenez heard both his colleagues and the operations guys laughing. She knew something had changed. Later that night at a bar. the beer flowed in massive quantities. but she happily picked up the check. Her brains and brawn shirt now hung on her office wallia symbol of everything that was wrong and everything that was possible. Collide-Cutter Conundrum Jimenez again came back to the present. She closed the file, got up abnrptly, and grabbed her coat. She needed some air and some food and decided to walk the two blocks to the local sandwich joint. She felt a little like an inventor who has just developed a great new invention that is certain to make the company tons of money. \"Thal's greatl" an imaginary boss replies. \"Now give me another so just like it!" As she walked. she tried to think objectively about the Lubbock site. Lubbock was in better shape than Wichita to begin with but not by much. Operating costs there were too high, and the plant rarely met its production goals. Acme had considered divesting its fofLubbock on more than one occasion. When Jimenez initially planned the teambased productivity rollout. she had thought of Lubbock as a beta sit any kinks from Wichita would be worked out there. and then the plan would be rolled out to the rest of the company over a twoyear period. The sharedservices department didth have the staff to oversee Wichna's finetumng and concentrate on Lubbock as well, so Jimenez assigned only one ofher top internal consultants, Jennifer Peterson and two ochlcfscu's staff to the Lubbock project. She then engaged Daniels's former consulting firm and assigned Dave Matthews, a vice president of the rm. on-site responsibility. Bad news seemed to dog Jimenez at every turn. For example, Keller declined to be a part of the team. Mystified and a little hurt. Jimenez turned up the pressure a hit hinting that it might look bad for him not to work on the Lubbock site. Keller was resolute. \"Look. Kafcn.\" he had said. \"I'm as years old. My kids are all out ofthe house. I've relocated ten times for the company, but lplan to retire soon. 1 don't want to spend the next three years burning myself out traveling all over the country. I'm staying in Wichita. lfi have to, 1'11 take early retirement and walk." Although Jimenez thought he might be bluffmg, she couldn't afford to call his hand. Keller had many powerful allies in the company and was viewed as the prototypical Acme man; his latest success with the Wichita turnaround was seen as yet another in a series of impressive achievements. Jimenez knew she couldn't afford to lose his experience and knowledge; if she couldn't get him full time. she would do her best to pick his brain and transfer his knowledge to a project team. Keller had promised full access to his entire staff e consultants could interview and brainstorm and strategize all they wanted. Jimenez. Peterson, and Matthews took advantage ofthat opportunity. but even extensive interviews with Keller and his staff hadn't yielded any truly valuable insights, No matter how carefully Jimenez and her group tried to recreate the circumstances and techniques that had worked so well in Wichita, they made very little progress. The Lubbock employees just didn't seem to react with the same enthusiasm as the Wichita workers had, Because no one was showing up for the problem chats%espite the "selling" of the meetings' benets by Jimenez, Peterson, and Manhcwsiattcndanct: as ade mandatory. it was true that Jimenez's team had attempted to rduce the cycle time and \"(Dial time to inv stment recove " ofthe project, but that goal hadn't seemed unreasonable. !' ez thought that the . would be fewer mistakes in Lubbock and that the projee would need less time and fewer resources than Wichita had. Jfauything, just the opposite occurred. Problems never encountered on the wichita project created havoc at Lubbock. one particularly vexing to Jimncz was that the Lubbock workers re . ed to engage in any ofthe teambuilding exercises and events developed for them by the project team. The soball games that had been played with enthus m in Wichita were 'pped by the Lubbock crowd until the project team finally offered to spring for food and beer. Even then there was more eating than playing. I felt like 1 was on ng piison inmates. Jimenez remembered. There had been some iniprovenrents. The site had begun to meet its weekly goals more consistently and had seen some reduction in operations and maintenance costs. Normally. Jimenez would have been complimented on a job well done. but in the context ofwhat had gone before and what was expected, the improvements wucn'l enoughiand Jimenez knew it She returned to her ofce. still without an answer. Pull and generous funding had been approved for teambased productivity project by the steering committee at the personal request ofBill Daniel this level of funding was not easily come by at Acme. How could she convince Wwilhoul looking like a failureithat the project couldn't be rolled out with the speed and grace he envisioned? Whath more. it was clear that stalling the implementation would dull some of the projecth luster and in all likelihood jeopardize funding. She did think that the project would work given time. but she wasn't exactly sure how. And any waffiing might get her crucified by her colleagues. The meeting with the senior managers was rapidly approaching. What could she say to Ihem'! How can Jlmnez mud: the armies! In succcss'?