Levi Strauss and Wrangler are planning new generation jeans and must decide on the colors for their products. The possible colors are white, black, and violet. The payoff to each firm depends on the color it chooses and the color chosen by its rival, as the profit matrix shows. Suppose the firms move sequentially, with Wrangler moving first. Levi Strauss engages in pre$-$play communication $($cheap tak$).$ Levi Strauss tells. Wrangler that it will match Wrangler's color choice if Wrangler chooses black and violet but that if Wrangler opts for white. Levi Strauss will choose Violet. Why would Levi Strauss want Wrangler to believe this claim? Levi Strauss would want Wrangler to believo this claim so that Levi Strauss could recelve a payolf of s $($Enter your response os a Whole number$)$ Should Wrangler believe it$?$ Wrangler shouldWhy would Levi Strauss want Wrangler to believe this claim? Levi Strauss would want Wrangler to believe this claim so that Levi Strauss could receive a payoff of $\backslash (\backslash$$ $\backslash )($Enter your response as a whole number.$)$ Should Wrangler believe it$?$ Wrangler should A$.$ believe the claim because Levi Strauss moves second. B$.$ believe the claim because it maximizes the combined payoffs. C$.$ not believe the claim because it does not satisfy the Pareto criterion. D$.$ believe the claim because it maximizes Levi Strauss's payoff E$.$ not believe the claim because it is not credible.