Mini Case: "Terminating the Superconducting Super Collider Project" , answer the belowquestions:

CASE STUDY 13.2 The Superconducting Supercollider Conceived in the 1980s as a device to accelerate particles project, these countries became vague about their levels in high-energy physics research, the Superconducting of contribution and time frame for payment. Supercollider (SSC) was a political and technical hot Another huge problem was finding a suitable loca- potato from the beginning. The technical challenges as- tion for the site of the SSC. At its peak, work on the SSC sociated with the SSC were daunting. Its purpose was to was expected to employ 4,500 workers. Further, once smash subatomic particles together at near the speed of in full-time operation, the SSC would require a perma- light. That would require energy levels of 40 trillion elec- nent staff of 2,500 employees and an annual operating tron volts. Using the physics of quantum mechanics, the budget of $270 million. Clearly, it was to almost every goal of the project was to shed light on some of the fun- state's interest to lure the SSC. The result was a political damental questions about the formation of the universe. nightmare as the National Research Council appointed The SSC was designed to be the largest particle accelera a site review committee to evaluate proposals from 43 tor ever constructed, far bigger than its counterpart at states. After making their judgments based on a series Fermi Laboratory. In order to achieve these energy levels, of performance and capability criteria, the committee a set of 10,000 magnets was needed. Each of the magnets, narrowed their list to eight states. Finally, in late 1988, cylindrical in shape (1 foot in diameter and 57 feet long), the contract for the SSC was awarded to Waxahachie, would need to operate at peak levels if the accelerator Texas, on a 16,000-acre tract south of Dallas. While were to achieve the necessary energy levels for proton Texas was thrilled with the award, the decision meant collision. The expected price tag just for the construction ruffled feathers for a number of other states and their of the magnets was estimated at $1.5 billion. disappointed congressional representatives. The technical difficulties were only part of the over- The final problem with the SSC almost from the all scope of the project. Construction of the SSC would be beginning was the mounting federal budget deficit, an undertaking of unique proportions. Scientists deter- which caused more and more politicians to question mined that the accelerator required a racetrack-shaped the decision to allocate money at a time when Congress form, buried underground for easier use. The overall was looking for ways to cut more than $30 billion from circumference of the planned SSC required 54 miles of the budget. This concern ended up being a long-term tunnel to be bored 165 to 200 feet underground. The ini- problem, as the SSC was allocated only $100 million for tial budget estimate for completing the project was $5 1989, less than one third of its initial $348 million fund- billion, and the estimated schedule would require eight ing request. Budget battles would be a constant refrain years to finish the construction and technical assemblies. throughout the SSC's short life. The SSC's problems began almost immediately Work proceeded slowly on the Waxahachie site after President Reagan's 1988 kickoff of the project. First, throughout the early 1990s. Meanwhile, European finan- the public (including Congress) had little understand- cial support for the project was not forthcoming. The ing of the purpose of the project. A goal as nebulous as various governments privately suspected that the project 'particle acceleration" for high-energy physics was not would never be completed. Their fears were becoming one easily embraced by a majority of citizens. The origi- increasingly justified as the cost of the project contin- nal operating consortium, URA, consisted of 80 public ued to rise. By 1993, the original $5 billion estimate had and private American research centers and universities, ballooned to $11 billion. Meanwhile, less than 20% of but it was expected that European and Asian scientists the construction had been completed. The process was also would wish to conduct experiments with the SSC. further slowed when Congress began investigating Consequently, the U.S. Department of Energy hoped to expenditures and determined that accounting proce- offset some of the cost through other countries. While dures were inadequate. Clearly, control of the project's initially receptive to the idea of participating in the budget and schedule had become a serious concern.In a last desperate move to save SSC funding, groups that began asking legitimate questions about Energy Secretary Hazel O'leary fired URA as prime expenditures and skyrocketing budget requests. In contractor for the construction project. There was talk place of evidence of definable progress, the project of replacing URA with a proven contractor-Martin offered only a sense of out-of-control costs and poor Marietta and Bechtel were the two leading candidates. oversight-clearly not the message to send when By then, however, it was a case of too little, too late. American taxpayers were questioning their decision Costs continued to climb and work proceeded at such to foot a multibillion-dollar bill. a snail's pace that when the 1994 federal budget was put together, funding for the SSC had been removed Questions entirely. The project was dead. The nonrecoverable costs 1. Suppose you were a consultant called into the to the U.S. taxpayer from the aborted project have been project by the federal government in 1990, when estimated at anywhere between $1 billion and $2 billion. it still seemed viable. Given the start to the project, Few questioned the government's capability to what steps would you have taken to reintroduce construct such a facility. The technology, though lead- some positive "spin" on the Superconducting ing-edge, had been used previously in other research Supercollider? laboratories. The problem was that the pro- and anti- 2. What were the warning signs of impending fail- SSC camps tended to split between proponents of ure as the project progressed? Could these signs pure research and those who argued (increasingly have been recognized so that problems could swaying political support their way) that multibil- have been foreseen and addressed or, in your lion-dollar research having no immediate discernible opinion, was the project simply impossible to impact on society was a luxury we could not afford, achieve? Take a position and argue its merits. particularly in an era of federal budget cuts and hard 3. Search for "superconducting supercollider" on the choices. The SSC position was further weakened Internet. How do the majority of stories about the by the activities of the research consortium super- project present it? Given the negative perspective, vising the project, URA. Its behavior was termed what are the top three lessons to be learned from increasingly arrogant by congressional oversight this project