Mixed Strategies Nash Equilibrium: Use the generalized form of the battle of the Sexes below, where K>1. Use a similar approach as above to determine values of w and h that will result in a mixed strategies Nash Equilibrium. Your answers will be a function of K. ----- I only need help with part e on the image attachment but provided parts a-d for reference. Thanks!

2. Solving mixed-strategies NE. Use the following payoff matrix for Battle of the Sexes (which is different from what we M used in class). Recall our process to find B S the mixed-strategies NE is for player 1 to W B (4, 3) (0, 0) choose probabilities such that player 2 will be indifferent between possible actions. Let S (0, 0) (3, 4) SM = (h, 1 - h). (a) What is the expected payoff to the woman if she plays "basketball," i.e., in probabilities, SW = (1,0). (b) What is the expected payoff to the woman if she plays "soccer." (c) For what value of h will the woman be indifferent between the two actions? [This is your "solution" for h. ] (d) Now do the same process to determine w, where sw = (w, 1 - w). In other words, what value of w will make the man indifferent between the two actions?(e) Use the generalized form of the Battle of the Sexes below, where K > 1. Use a similar approach as above to determine values of w and h that will result in a mixed-strategies NE. Your answers will be a function of K. M B S B W (K , 1) (0, 0) S (0, 0) (1, K)