Need help with this GameTheory question, really appreciate!!!

Two firms are price-competing as in the standard Bertrand model. Each faces the market demand function D(p) = 1000 - p. Firm 1 has constant marginal cost c1 = 200, while firm 2 has the constant marginal cost c2 = 400. If one of the firms has the lower price, they capture the entire market, like the standard model. However, when they charge exactly the same price, firm 2 gets 75 percent of the demand, firm 1 gets the remaining quarter. (a) Draw the profit function #1 (p1, p2) when p2 = 600. (Mark sure to label all points of interest on all graphs: maximum values, axis crossings, points of discontinuity, axes labels) (b) Draw the profit function 72(P1, P2) when p1 = 600. (c) Write out the best-response correspondences Bi(p2) and B2(p1) as functions of p2 and p1 respec- tively. (d) Is there an equilibrium for this game as defined? (e) Suppose S1 = $2 = {0.00, 0.01, 0.02, ..., 1000.00}. That is, instead of any real number we force prices in whole cents. i. Provide 2 Nash Equilibria in pure strategies for this game. 2 ii. Calculate the profits for each firm under any one of these equilibria, accurate to the nearest cent