PART B. [2 points] For part B, assume 100% of the cash flow is lost upon bankrupte (i.e., when debtholders control the firm). Also, assume that renegotiations are allower and the manager may be allowed to stay if debtholders find it better than firing. Upon renegotiation debt and equity holders have 3:2 bargaining power. 1-4. Draw value of equity. 1-5. Do you expect the company value to be higher or lower than the case considered in PART A? a. higher b. lower c. same d. unknown due to asymmetric bargaining power PART B. [2 points] For part B, assume 100% of the cash flow is lost upon bankrupte (i.e., when debtholders control the firm). Also, assume that renegotiations are allower and the manager may be allowed to stay if debtholders find it better than firing. Upon renegotiation debt and equity holders have 3:2 bargaining power. 1-4. Draw value of equity. 1-5. Do you expect the company value to be higher or lower than the case considered in PART A? a. higher b. lower c. same d. unknown due to asymmetric bargaining power