please answer all parts

3. Consider the following predation game. Firm E (the Entrant) is consid ering whether to go "In" or stay "Out" of the industry that currently has a single Incumbent (Firm I). If Firm E chooses "In" the Incumbent can respond in either of two ways: cither "Fight" the Entrant (start a price war), or "Accommodate" by giving up some of its sales with no change in market price. The extensive form of the whole game is given below: Firm E Out In Firm I Payoff's Firm E Firm I Fight Accommodate- (a) How many strategies does each firm have? List all strategies for both players. (b) Represent the game in a strategic form, and find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (c) Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game. Describe the steps you take to find the SPNE. (d) Are there Nash equilibria in this game that are not subgame per- fect? If yes, what are they, and do they rely on non-credible threats? Explain