Please answer the following:

3. You may assume that all prices in this problem are denoted in millions of Euros. a. Suppose that you have data on Brazil's supply and demand schedules for small commercial jet cra. D = 10 P; QS = 2 +P. (i) Show graphically how you would use this data to construct Brazil's export supply and import demand. (ii) Derive Brazil's export supply and import demand schedules as a function of the world price. (iii) What is the autarky price in Brazil? b. Suppose that Brazil and France only trade with each other. French people love these new small jet craft, but have little ability to produce them. Their import demand for the small jet aircraft is given by: Import demand 5 MDF = 24 P. Find the world price and the volume of trade in the free trade equilibrium. 0. Suppose that France puts a tariff of 1 million euros on jet craft imports om Brazil. (i) Find the exports supplied, the imports demanded and the new world price in the tariff-distorted equilibrium. (ii) Provide an extremely well-labeled graph to illustrate your numerical answer. d. (i) Calculate the amount of tariff revenue paid by Brazilian exporters and French importers, respectively, in the tariff-distorted equilibrium. (ii) Who pays a higher percentage of the tariff revenue. (iii) Provide some intuition for this result. (iv) Provide an extremely well-labeled graph to illustrate your numerical answer. e. Suppose that instead of a tariff France decides to impose an import quota that limits jet imports to no more than 11% . The quotas are given to the Brazilian trade minister who distributes them to Brazil's small jet craft producer (Embraer). Compare the welfare e'ects of the tariff versus the quota in France and Brazil. f. In this section we are going to compare a quota to a tariff when demand changes. To focus on the welfare effects of uncertainty on tariffs versus quotas you should assume that France retains all of the quota rents. Suppose that France's import demand for small jet craft grows. Show graphically what happens when demand increases if the French market is protected by a quota (of 11%) or an initially equivalent tari' (of 1 million euros and provide a graphical answer that shows which instrument leads to the better welfare outcome for France