Please help me with problem 6

The picture of problem 1 has the background info.

1 Problem 1 Two criminals have been caught by the police. Because of lack of evidence the prosecution needs a confession to convict. If no confession ensures, they will be charged and convinced for a minor offense earning them one year less than a conviction for the main crime. The prosecutor offers each prisoner the following deal. If she confesses, and the other does not, she will get three years off her sentence whereas the other prisoner will get an extra year in prison. If both confess, they will be punished according to the law (no reductions). This story easily translates into the following strategic form game (N; X; SA, 83; (uA, 253)) with N E {A, B} is the set of players; S A E {0, N} E S B is the set of strategies common to both players, where C implies \"confess\3 Problem 6 Consider a situation that there are two students, 1 and 2, who are planning to do some joint project. To do it, they need to purchase a PC, which is either of Mac-type and Windows-type. To implement the joint project, it is convenient for them to purchase the same type of PC's together. Moreover, because of the characteristic of the joint project they have considered, jointing using Mac-type PC is more suited to the project than using Windows-type. Note that for each of 1 and 2, his/her available action is to purchase 'Mac' or 'Windows'. Therefore, for 1, his strategy set is specified by A1 = {mac, windows}. Likewise, for 2, her strategy set is specified by A2 = {mac, windows}. Then, a strategic-form game (N; A1, A2; (u1, u2)) with N = {1, 2} is specified by: for the payoff function u1 : A1 X A2 - R of the player 1, we have: ul (mac, mac) = a , u1 (windows, mac) = B, u1 (mac, windows) = y , u1 (windows, windows) = onwhile for the payoff function U2 : Al x A2 > R of the player 2, we have: uz (mac, mac) 2 a, U2 (windows, mac) 2 7, U2 (mac, windows) 2 5, U2 (windows, windows) = 6, where a, [3, \"y, and 6 are real numbers satisfying as > 7 = 6 > [3. Given this game, answer the following questions: (1) Describe the game matrix of this game. (2) Show whether there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium in this game or not, and moreover, if yes, what a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game is. (3) Show whether there exists a dominanted Nash equilibrium in this game or not, and moreover, if yes, what a dominanted Nash equilibrium of the game is