please help on this with detailed explaination

2. (40) Consider modifying the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model to allow for informed traders to mistakenly inter- pret their private information. Suppose that the true value is VH = 1 or VI = 0 with equal probability. A proportion 1 -a = of traders are uninformed liquidity traders who buy or sell with equal probability, while the remaining a = are informed insiders, who choose their trade direction correctly only with probability X = X, submitting the wrong type of order 1 - 1 = 1 of the time. (a) (10) Draw the game tree. (b) (10) Calculate the conditional probabilities of receiving buy and sell orders, given each possible value of V. (C) (10) Using Bayes' rule, calculate the posterior probabilities of V taking each of its values, conditional upon observing either type of order. (d) (10) Calculate the bid and ask prices and report the bid-ask spread. How does it compare to spread in the standard model? 2. (40) Consider modifying the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model to allow for informed traders to mistakenly inter- pret their private information. Suppose that the true value is VH = 1 or VI = 0 with equal probability. A proportion 1 -a = of traders are uninformed liquidity traders who buy or sell with equal probability, while the remaining a = are informed insiders, who choose their trade direction correctly only with probability X = X, submitting the wrong type of order 1 - 1 = 1 of the time. (a) (10) Draw the game tree. (b) (10) Calculate the conditional probabilities of receiving buy and sell orders, given each possible value of V. (C) (10) Using Bayes' rule, calculate the posterior probabilities of V taking each of its values, conditional upon observing either type of order. (d) (10) Calculate the bid and ask prices and report the bid-ask spread. How does it compare to spread in the standard model