Please help.

Two investors have each deposited Dwith a bank. The bank has invested these deposits in a longterm project. If the bank is forced to liquidate its investment before the project matures, a total of 27- can be recovered, where D > 'r > 13/2. lfthe bank allows the investment to reach maturity. however, the project will pay out a total of 2R, where R > D. There are two dates at which the investors can make withdrawals from the bank: date 1 is before the bank's investment matures: date 2 is after. For simplicity, assume that there is no time discounting. If both investors make withdrawals at date 1 then each receives 1' and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then that investor receives D, the other receives 21- D, and the game end s. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then the project matures and the investors make withdrawal decisions at date 2. If both investors make withdrawals at date 2 then each receives R and the game ends. In only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2. then that investor receives 2R D, the other receives D, and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns R to each investor and the game ends. 1. Please draw the payoff matrices of this game. 2. Please find all the purestrategy Nash equilibria. 3. Please provide interpretation to the Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium is Pareto optimal