please refer to pictures

Consider the case of a Simultaneous-Move Game: Consider the case of two households (Amber and Blatz), each can choose one of the two strategies --- cooperate or deviate. AMBER Cooperate Deviate Cooperate Box 1 Box 2 BLATZ 30, 6 19, 65 Box 3 Box 4 Deviate 45, 5 40, 74 Part 1: If Blatz chooses to cooperate, Amber's best strategy is to because is greater than Part 2: If Blatz chooses to deviate, Amber's best strategy is to because is greater than Part 3: If Amber chooses to cooperate, Blatz's best strategy is to because is greater than Part 4: If Amber chooses to deviate, Blatz's best strategy is to because is greater than Part 5: Is there a dominant strategy for Amber? itps://courseware.mymru.ca/webapps/blackboard/content/contentWrapper.jsp?content_id=_5310661_1&displayName=LM+-+Econ+1101+-+TAKE+HOME+AS... 17/1912/8/2020 Mount Royal University = Part 6: Is there a dominant strategy for Blatz? Part 7: Is Box 1 a Nash Equilibrium? Part 8: Is Box 2 a Nash Equilibrium? Part 9: Is Box 3 a Nash Equilibrium? Part 10: Is Box 4 a Nash Equilibrium