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Consider an industry with two firms. Let q1 be the output of firm 1,q2 for firm 2 , and Q=q1+q2. Consumer demand is P(Q)=40Q. Both firms have a cost function of c(q)=5q. Assume that firms engage in Stackelber competition, where firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 the follower. (1) Obtain the best response of the folloewr to the output choice of the leader. (2) Obtain the leader's profit as a function of q1 taking into account the follower's reaction. Find the leader's profit maximizing output. (3) Find firm 2's profit maximizing quantity. (4) Find the market price and the profits for both firms. Now, assume that the firms compete la Cournot. (5) Find the output of each firm at the equilibrium. (6) Find the equilibrium price. Are consumers better off in Cournot or Stackelberg competition? (7) Find each firm's profit. Consider an industry with two firms. Let q1 be the output of firm 1,q2 for firm 2 , and Q=q1+q2. Consumer demand is P(Q)=40Q. Both firms have a cost function of c(q)=5q. Assume that firms engage in Stackelber competition, where firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 the follower. (1) Obtain the best response of the folloewr to the output choice of the leader. (2) Obtain the leader's profit as a function of q1 taking into account the follower's reaction. Find the leader's profit maximizing output. (3) Find firm 2's profit maximizing quantity. (4) Find the market price and the profits for both firms. Now, assume that the firms compete la Cournot. (5) Find the output of each firm at the equilibrium. (6) Find the equilibrium price. Are consumers better off in Cournot or Stackelberg competition? (7) Find each firm's profit