Prepare a legal brief on the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ___ (2011) which can be found at this link. www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/09-1272.ZS.html The case is also attached to this assignment. The case brief will be graded on the rubric in the student resources section under case brief. Please carefully review the rubric before you start the assignment. Please attach your brief to this assignment as a word document. By briefing a case, you are reading the entire court opinion then summarizing it into your own words so that the important information from the brief is easier to understand and remember. Legal case names should be done in standard "Blue Book" format. Example: York v. Smith, 65 U.S. 294 (1995). For further information see http://www.law.cornell.edu/citation and look under the "How to Cite" section. In addition see the web resource section for this course and click on the folder marked "how to brief a case". *** Please review the materials in the Resources section of the classroom under the Case Brief folder. These will be useful to you because they instruct ("How to..") students about the case briefing process, shows the relationship between the Opinion and the brief (Opinion and Model Case Brief), and then enables you to see the relationship between the case brief and the grading process (Rubric). Case briefs are used to highlight the key information contained within a case for use within the legal community as court cases can be quite lengthy. When writing case briefs, all information must be properly cited. Make sure you are not copying and pasting from your source. Most of the material should be paraphrased; quotations should make up no more than 10% of the brief. Note: since the purpose to is highlight and summarize key information, merely copying and pasting from the case does not accomplish this goal. You must summarize the facts in your own words, using quotations sparingly. Page 1 Page 2 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 1 of 1 DOCUMENT KENTUCKY, Petitioner v. HOLLIS DESHAUN KING No. 09-1272 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 131 S. Ct. 1849; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306; 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 979 January 12, 2011, Argued May 16, 2011, Decided NOTICE: The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to change pending release of the final published version. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: On remand at, Remanded by King v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 45 (Ky., Apr. 26, 2012) PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY. King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 3 (Ky., 2010) DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. CASE SUMMARY: PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed respondent's drug conviction, holding that exigent circumstances could not justify the officers' search under the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants in the apartment would destroy evidence when the police knocked on the door and announced their presence. Petitioner State of Kentucky's petition for certiorari was granted. OVERVIEW: The exigent circumstances rule justified a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency was reasonable. The exigent circumstances rule applied when the police did not gain entry by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. One officer testified without contradiction that the officers banged on the door as loud as they could and announced either "Police, police, police" or "This is the police." There was no evidence they either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment. There was no evidence of a "demand" of any sort, much less a demand that amounted to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. Any contradictory evidence not brought to the Supreme Court's attention was for the state court to address on remand. As the officer testified, noises inside the apartment then led the officers to believe that drugrelated evidence was about to be destroyed, and, at that point they explained they were going to make entry. Given that the announcement was made after the exigency arose, it could not have created the exigency. OUTCOME: The Supreme Court of Kentucky's judgment reversing the conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 8-1 Decision; 1 Dissent. CORE TERMS: exigency, door, apartment, exigent circumstances, occupant, law enforcement, warrantless search, knock, destruction of evidence, inside, warrant requirement, probable cause, destroyed, destroy evidence, police Page 3 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 officers, marijuana, announced, searches and seizures, warrantless entry, reasonably foreseeable, police-created, impermissibly, noise", warrantless, announcing, "emergency", knocking, knocked, loudly, quotation marks omitted LexisNexis(R) Headnotes Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Warrants Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Destruction of Evidence [HN1] It is well established that exigent circumstances, including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant. Criminal Law & Procedure > Accusatory Instruments > Dismissal > Appellate Review Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Remands & Remittiturs [HN2] The United States Supreme Court's reversal of a state supreme court's decision reversing a conviction reinstates the judgment of conviction and the sentence entered by the trial court. The absence of an indictment due to the trial court's dismissal of the indictment in the interim does not change matters. Upon the defendant's conviction and sentence, the indictment that was returned against him is merged into his conviction and sentence. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > General Overview [HN3] See U.S. Const. amend IV. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Scope of Protection Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Reasonableness & Prudence Standard [HN4] The text of the Fourth Amendment expressly imposes two requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second, a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Warrants Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Reasonableness & Prudence Standard [HN5] Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, the United States Supreme Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured. It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. This presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Accordingly, the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions. One well-recognized exception applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Destruction of Evidence Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Hot Pursuit Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Protection of Officers & Others [HN6] Under the emergency aid exception, officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. Police officers may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. And, the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Page 4 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Warrants Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Destruction of Evidence [HN7] In applying the imminent destruction of evidence exception to the search warrant requirement for the creation or manufacturing of an exigency by the police, courts require something more than mere proof that fear of detection by the police caused the destruction of evidence. An additional showing is obviously needed because in some sense the police always create the exigent circumstances. That is to say, in the vast majority of cases in which evidence is destroyed by persons who are engaged in illegal conduct, the reason for the destruction is fear that the evidence will fall into the hands of law enforcement. Consequently, a rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this wellestablished exception to the warrant requirement. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Reasonableness & Prudence Standard [HN8] Warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Therefore, the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. Where the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Plain View Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Plain View [HN9] Law enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made. It is an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. So long as this prerequisite is satisfied, however, it does not matter that the officer who makes the observation may have gone to the spot from which the evidence was seen with the hope of being able to view and seize the evidence. Instead, the Fourth Amendment requires only that the steps preceding the seizure be lawful. Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Consent to Search > General Overview [HN10] Officers may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual encounter occurs. If consent is freely given, it makes no difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or expectation of obtaining consent. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > General Overview [HN11] Law enforcement officers do not impermissibly create exigent circumstances when they act in an entirely lawful manner. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Administrative Searches Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Reasonableness & Prudence Standard Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Inventory Searches [HN12] The United States Supreme Court's cases have repeatedly rejected a subjective approach to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, asking only whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Indeed, the Court has never held, outside limited contexts such as an inventory search or administrative inspection, that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment. The Page 5 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 reasons for looking to objective factors, rather than subjective intent, are clear. Legal tests based on reasonableness are generally objective, and the Court has long taken the view that evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Plain View Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Plain View [HN13] The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that police may seize evidence without a warrant only when they come across the evidence by happenstance. Police may seize evidence in plain view even though the officers may be interested in an item of evidence and fully expect to find it in the course of a search. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Reasonableness & Prudence Standard [HN14] The calculus of reasonableness for purposes of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Probable Cause Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Search Warrants > Probable Cause > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > Reasonableness & Prudence Standard [HN15] Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant. Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Search & Seizure > Exigent Circumstances Criminal Law & Procedure > Search & Seizure > Warrantless Searches > Exigent Circumstances > General Overview [HN16] Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency. DECISION: [**865] Need to prevent destruction of evidence held to constitute exigency (1) not created by police officers by knocking on apartment door and announcing presence; and (2) justifying warrantless search where officers did not violate or threaten to violate Fourth Amendment prior to exigency. SUMMARY: Procedural posture: The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed respondent's drug conviction, holding that exigent circumstances could not justify the officers' search under the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants in the apartment would destroy evidence when the police knocked on the door and announced their presence. Petitioner State of Kentucky's petition for certiorari was granted. Overview: The exigent circumstances rule justified a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency was reasonable. The exigent circumstances rule applied when the police did not gain entry by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. One officer testified without contradiction that the officers banged on the door as loud as they could and announced either "Police, police, police" or "This is the police." There was no evidence they either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment. There was no evidence of a "demand" of any sort, much less a demand that amounted to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. Any contradictory evidence not brought to the Supreme Court's attention was for the state court to address on remand. As the officer testified, noises inside the apartment then led the officers to believe that drugrelated evidence was about to be destroyed, and, at that point they explained they were going to make entry. Given that the announcement was made after the exigency arose, it could not have created the exigency. Page 6 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 Outcome: The Supreme Court of Kentucky's judgment reversing the conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 8-1 Decision; 1 Dissent. LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES: [**866] [**LEdHN1] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 LACK OF WARRANT -- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES Headnote:[1] It is well established that exigent circumstances, including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN2] APPEAL 1749 REVERSAL OF CONVICTION -- EFFECT Headnote:[2] The United States Supreme Court's reversal of a state supreme court's decision reversing a conviction reinstates the judgment of conviction and the sentence entered by the trial court. The absence of an indictment due to the trial court's dismissal of the indictment in the interim does not change matters. Upon the defendant's conviction and sentence, the indictment that was returned against him is merged into his conviction and sentence. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN3] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 4 FOURTH AMENDMENT Headnote:[3] See U.S. Const. amend. IV, which provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN4] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 4 FOURTH AMENDMENT Headnote:[4] The text of the Fourth Amendment expressly imposes two requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second, a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN5] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 5 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.8 LACK OF WARRANT -- PRESUMPTIVE UNREASONABLENESS -- EXCEPTIONS -- EXIGENCIES Headnote:[5] Page 7 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, the United States Supreme Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured. It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. This presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Accordingly, the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions. One well-recognized exception applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**867] [**LEdHN6] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- EXCEPTIONS Headnote:[6] Under the emergency aid exception, officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. Police officers may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. And, the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN7] EVIDENCE 419 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- EXCEPTION -- PROOF NEEDED Headnote:[7] In applying the imminent destruction of evidence exception to the search warrant requirement for the creation or manufacturing of an exigency by the police, courts require something more than mere proof that fear of detection by the police caused the destruction of evidence. An additional showing is obviously needed because in some sense the police always create the exigent circumstances. That is to say, in the vast majority of cases in which evidence is destroyed by persons who are engaged in illegal conduct, the reason for the destruction is fear that the evidence will fall into the hands of law enforcement. Consequently, a rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this wellestablished exception to the warrant requirement. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN8] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- EXCEPTIONS -- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES Headnote:[8] Warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Therefore, the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. Where the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN9] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.1 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- EXCEPTION -- EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW Page 8 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 Headnote:[9] Law enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made. It is an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. So long as this prerequisite is satisfied, however, it does not matter that the officer who makes the observation may have gone to the spot from which the evidence was seen with the hope of being able to view [**868] and seize the evidence. Instead, the Fourth Amendment requires only that the steps preceding the seizure be lawful. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN10] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 14 CONSENT Headnote:[10] Officers may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual encounter occurs. If consent is freely given, it makes no difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or expectation of obtaining consent. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN11] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES Headnote:[11] Law enforcement officers do not impermissibly create exigent circumstances when they act in an entirely lawful manner. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN12] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- EXCEPTION -- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES -- JUSTIFICATION Headnote:[12] The United States Supreme Court's cases have repeatedly rejected a subjective approach to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, asking only whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Indeed, the Court has never held, outside limited contexts such as an inventory search or administrative inspection, that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment. The reasons for looking to objective factors, rather than subjective intent, are clear. Legal tests based on reasonableness are generally objective, and the Court has long taken the view that evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN13] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.1 LACK OF WARRANT -- EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW Headnote:[13] The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that police may seize evidence without a warrant only when they come across the evidence by happenstance. Police may seize evidence in plain view even though the officers may Page 9 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 be interested in an item of evidence and fully expect to find it in the course of a search. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN14] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- EXCEPTION -- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES Headnote:[14] The calculus of reasonableness for purposes of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, [**869] Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN15] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25 WARRANT REQUIREMENT -- PROBABLE CAUSE Headnote:[15] Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) [**LEdHN16] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25.2 WARRANTLESS ENTRY -- EXIGENCY Headnote:[16] Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency. (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) SYLLABUS [**870] [*1851] Police officers in Lexington, Kentucky, followed a suspected drug dealer to an apartment complex. They smelled marijuana outside an apartment door, knocked loudly, and announced their presence. As soon as the officers began knocking, they heard noises coming from the apartment; the officers believed that these noises were consistent with the destruction of evidence. The officers announced their intent to enter the apartment, kicked in the door, and found respondent and others. They saw drugs in plain view during a protective sweep of the apartment and found additional evidence during a subsequent search. The Circuit Court denied respondent's motion to suppress the evidence, holding that exigent circumstances--the need to prevent destruction of evidence--justified the warrantless entry. Respondent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, [*1852] and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. The court assumed that exigent circumstances existed, but it nonetheless invalidated the search. The exigent circumstances [***2] rule did not apply, the court held, because the police should have foreseen that their conduct would prompt the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence. Held: 1. The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 874-881. (a) The Fourth Amendment expressly imposes two requirements: All searches and seizures must be reasonable; and a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity. Although " 'searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,' Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, this presumption may be overcome Page 10 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 when " 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment," Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290. One such exigency is the need "to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence." Brigham City, supra, at 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650. Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 874-875. (b) Under the "police-created exigency" doctrine, which lower courts have developed as an exception to the [***3] exigent circumstances rule, exigent circumstances do not justify a warrantless search when the exigency was "created" or "manufactured" by the conduct of the police. The lower courts have not agreed, however, on the test for determining when police impermissibly create an exigency. Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 875-876. (c) The proper test follows from the principle that permits warrantless searches: warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Thus, a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances is reasonable when the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment. [**871] A similar approach has been taken in other cases involving warrantless searches. For example, officers may seize evidence in plain view if they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made, see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-140, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112; and they may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual encounter occurs, see INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, n. 5, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247. [***4] Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 876-877. (d) Some courts, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, have imposed additional requirements--asking whether officers " 'deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement,' 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (case below); reasoning that police may not rely on an exigency if " 'it was reasonably foreseeable that [their] investigative tactics . . . would create the exigent circumstances,' " ibid.; faulting officers for knocking on a door when they had sufficient evidence to seek a warrant but did not do so; and finding that officers created or manufactured an exigency when their investigation was contrary to standard or good law enforcement practices. Such requirements are [*1853] unsound and are thus rejected. Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 877-879. (e) Respondent contends that an exigency is impermissibly created when officers engage in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry was imminent and inevitable, but that approach is also flawed. The ability of officers to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such subtleties as the officers' tone of voice in announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their knocks. A forceful knock may be necessary [***5] to alert the occupants that someone is at the door, and unless officers identify themselves loudly enough, occupants may not know who is at their doorstep. Respondent's test would make it extremely difficult for officers to know how loudly they may announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock without running afoul of the police-created exigency rule. And in most cases, it would be nearly impossible for a court to determine whether that threshold had been passed. Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 879-880. 2. Assuming that an exigency existed here, there is no evidence that the officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment. Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 880-882. (a) Any question about whether an exigency existed here is better addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand. P. ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 881. (b) Assuming an exigency did exist, the officers' conduct--banging on the door and announcing their presence--was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Respondent has pointed to no evidence supporting his argument that the officers made any sort of "demand" to enter the apartment, much less a demand that amounts to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. If there is [***6] contradictory evidence that has not been brought to this Court's attention, the state court may elect to address that matter on remand. Finally, the record makes clear that the officers' announcement [**872] that they were going to enter the apartment was made after the exigency arose. Pp. ___ - ___, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 881-882. 302 S.W.3d 649, reversed and remanded. COUNSEL: Joshua D. Farley argued the cause for petitioner. Ann O'Connell argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court. Jamesa J. Drake argued the cause for respondent. Page 11 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 JUDGES: Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion. OPINION BY: ALITO OPINION Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. [HN1] [**LEdHR1] [1] It is well established that "exigent circumstances," including the need to prevent [*1854] the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant. In this case, we consider whether this rule applies when police, by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their presence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances rule does not apply in the case at hand because the police should have foreseen that their conduct would prompt the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence. We reject this [***7] interpretation of the exigent circumstances rule. The conduct of the police prior to their entry into the apartment was entirely lawful. They did not violate the Fourth Amendment or threaten to do so. In such a situation, the exigent circumstances rule applies. I A This case concerns the search of an apartment in Lexington, Kentucky. Police officers set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine outside an apartment complex. Undercover Officer Gibbons watched the deal take place from an unmarked car in a nearby parking lot. After the deal occurred, Gibbons radioed uniformed officers to move in on the suspect. He told the officers that the suspect was moving quickly toward the breezeway of an apartment building, and he urged them to "hurry up and get there" before the suspect entered an apartment. App. 20. In response to the radio alert, the uniformed officers drove into the nearby parking lot, left their vehicles, and ran to the breezeway. Just as they entered the breezeway, they heard a door shut and detected a very strong odor of burnt marijuana. At the end of the breezeway, the officers saw two apartments, one on the left and one on the right, and they did not know which apartment the suspect [***8] had entered. Gibbons had radioed that the suspect was running into the apartment on the right, but the officers did not hear this statement because they had already left their vehicles. Because they smelled marijuana smoke emanating from the apartment on the left, they approached the door of that apartment. Officer Steven Cobb, one of the uniformed officers who approached the door, testified that the officers banged on the left apartment door "as loud as [they] could" and announced, " 'This is the police' " or " 'Police, police, police.' " Id., at 22-23. Cobb said that "[a]s soon as [the officers] started banging on the door," they "could hear people inside moving," and "[i]t sounded as [though] things were being moved inside the apartment." Id., [**873] at 24. These noises, Cobb testified, led the officers to believe that drug-related evidence was about to be destroyed. At that point, the officers announced that they "were going to make entry inside the apartment." Ibid. Cobb then kicked in the door, the officers entered the apartment, and they found three people in the front room: respondent Hollis King, respondent's girlfriend, and a guest who was smoking marijuana.1 The officers performed a [***9] protective sweep of the apartment during which they saw marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. In a subsequent search, they also discovered crack cocaine, cash, and drug paraphernalia. 1 Respondent's girlfriend leased the apartment, but respondent stayed there part of the time, and his child lived there. Based on these facts, Kentucky conceded in state court that respondent has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a; see also 302 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Ky. 2010). [*1855] Police eventually entered the apartment on the right. Inside, they found the suspected drug dealer who was the initial target of their investigation. B Page 12 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 In the Fayette County Circuit Court, a grand jury charged respondent with trafficking in marijuana, first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and second-degree persistent felony offender status. Respondent filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless search, but the Circuit Court denied the motion. The Circuit Court concluded that the officers had probable cause to investigate the marijuana odor and that the officers "properly conducted [the investigation] by initially knocking on the door of the apartment unit [***10] and awaiting the response or consensual entry." App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. Exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry, the court held, because "there was no response at all to the knocking," and because "Officer Cobb heard movement in the apartment which he reasonably concluded were persons in the act of destroying evidence, particularly narcotics because of the smell." Ibid. Respondent then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court sentenced respondent to 11 years' imprisonment. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry because the police reasonably believed that evidence would be destroyed. The police did not impermissibly create the exigency, the court explained, because they did not deliberately evade the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. 302 S.W.3d 649 (2010). As a preliminary matter, the court observed that there was "certainly some question as to whether the sound of persons moving [inside the apartment] was sufficient to establish that evidence was being destroyed." Id., at 655. But the court did not answer [***11] that question. Instead, it "assume[d] for the purpose of argument that exigent circumstances existed." Ibid. To determine whether police impermissibly created the exigency, the Supreme Court of Kentucky announced a two-part test. First, the court held, police cannot "deliberately creat[e] the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant [**874] requirement." Id., at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, even absent bad faith, the court concluded, police may not rely on exigent circumstances if "it was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the court found no evidence of bad faith, it held that exigent circumstances could not justify the search because it was reasonably foreseeable that the occupants would destroy evidence when the police knocked on the door and announced their presence. Ibid. We granted certiorari. 561 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 61, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1150 (2010).2 2 After we granted certiorari, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted, which we denied. 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 625, 178 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2010). Respondent's principal argument was that the case was [***12] moot because, after the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed his conviction, the Circuit Court dismissed the charges against him. Respondent's argument is foreclosed by United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 581, n. 2, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 77 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1983). As we explained in Villamonte-Marquez, [HN2] [**LEdHR2] [2] our reversal of the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision "would reinstate the judgment of conviction and the sentence entered" by the Circuit Court. Ibid. The absence of an indictment does not change matters. See ibid. ("Upon respondents' conviction and sentence, the indictment that was returned against them was merged into their convictions and sentences"). [*1856] II A The Fourth Amendment provides: [HN3] [**LEdHR3] [3] "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." [HN4] [**LEdHR4] [4] The text of the Amendment thus expressly imposes two requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second, a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and [***13] the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). [HN5] [**LEdHR5] [5] Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained, this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured. "It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law,' " we have often said, " 'that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.' Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006) (quoting Groh v. Page 13 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004)). But we have also recognized that this presumption may be overcome in some circumstances because "[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.' Brigham City, supra, at 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650; see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2009) (per curiam). Accordingly, the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions. Brigham City, supra, at 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650. One well-recognized exception applies when " 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless [**875] search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978); see [***14] also Payton, supra, at 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant"). This Court has identified several exigencies that may justify a warrantless search of a home. See Brigham City, 547 U.S., at 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650. [HN6] [**LEdHR6] [6] Under the "emergency aid" exception, for example, "officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury." Ibid.; see also, e.g., Fisher, supra, at ___, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410, 413 (upholding warrantless home entry based on emergency aid exception). Police officers may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976). And--what is relevant here--the need "to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence" has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search. Brigham City, supra, at 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116, n. 6, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006); [*1857] Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990).3 3 Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing with [***15] Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-396, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997) (failure to comply with the knock-andannounce requirement was justified because "the circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to do so"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (warrantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on potential destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37-40, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk that suspect would dispose of cocaine). B Over the years, lower courts have developed an exception to the exigent circumstances rule, the so-called "policecreated exigency" doctrine. Under this doctrine, police may not rely on the need to prevent destruction of evidence when that exigency was "created" or "manufactured" by the conduct of the police. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (CA6 2005) ("[F]or a warrantless search to stand, law enforcement officers must be responding to [***16] an unanticipated exigency rather than simply creating the exigency for themselves");United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (CA5 2004) (en banc) ("[A]lthough exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless probable cause entry into the home, they will not do so if the exigent circumstances were manufactured by the agents" (internal quotation marks omitted)). [HN7] [**LEdHR7] [7] In applying this exception for the "creation" or "manufacturing" of an exigency by the police, courts require something more than mere proof that fear of detection by the police caused the destruction of evidence. An additional showing is obviously needed because, as the Eighth Circuit has recognized, "in some sense the police [**876] always create the exigent circumstances." United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (CA8 1990). That is to say, in the vast majority of cases in which evidence is destroyed by persons who are engaged in illegal conduct, the reason for the destruction is fear that the evidence will fall into the hands of law enforcement. Destruction of evidence issues probably occur most frequently in drug cases because drugs may be easily destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing them down a drain. Persons in [***17] possession of valuable drugs are unlikely to destroy them unless they fear discovery by the police. Consequently, a rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established exception to the warrant requirement. Presumably for the purpose of avoiding such a result, the lower courts have held that the police-created exigency doctrine requires more than simple causation, but the lower courts have not agreed on the test to be applied. Indeed, the Page 14 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 petition in this case maintains that "[t]here are currently five different tests being used by the United States Courts of Appeals," Pet. for Cert. 11, and that some state courts have crafted additional tests, id., at 19-20. III A Despite the welter of tests devised by the lower courts, the answer to the question presented in this case follows [*1858] directly and clearly from the principle that permits warrantless searches in the first place. As previously noted, [HN8] [**LEdHR8] [8] warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant [***18] requirement. Therefore, the answer to the question before us is that the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. Where, as here, the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.4 4 There is a strong argument to be made that, at least in most circumstances, the exigent circumstances rule should not apply where the police, without a warrant or any legally sound basis for a warrantless entry, threaten that they will enter without permission unless admitted. In this case, however, no such actual threat was made, and therefore we have no need to reach that question. We have taken a similar approach in other cases involving warrantless searches. For example, we have held that [HN9] [**LEdHR9] [9] law enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-140, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990). As we [***19] put it in Horton, "[i]t is . . . an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed." Id., at 136, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112. So long as this prerequisite is satisfied, however, it does not matter that the officer who makes the observation [**877] may have gone to the spot from which the evidence was seen with the hope of being able to view and seize the evidence. See id., at 138, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 ("The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure"). Instead, the Fourth Amendment requires only that the steps preceding the seizure be lawful. See id., at 136-137, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112. Similarly, [HN10] [**LEdHR10] [10] officers may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual encounter occurs. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, n. 5, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984) (noting that officers who entered into consent-based encounters with employees in a factory building were "lawfully present [in the factory] pursuant to consent or a warrant"). If consent is freely given, it makes no difference that an officer [***20] may have approached the person with the hope or expectation of obtaining consent. See id., at 216, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 ("While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response"). B Some lower courts have adopted a rule that is similar to the one that we recognize today. See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (CA2 1990) (en banc) ( [HN11] [**LEdHR11] [11] law enforcement officers "do not impermissibly create exigent circumstances" when they "act in an entirely lawful manner"); State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, P32, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 326-328, 786 N.W.2d 463, 475-476 (2010). But others, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, have imposed [*1859] additional requirements that are unsound and that we now reject. Bad faith. Some courts, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, ask whether law enforcement officers " 'deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement.' 302 S.W.3d, at 656 (quoting Gould, 364 F.3d, at 590); see also, e.g., Chambers, 395 F.3d, at 566; United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1448, 269 U.S. App. D.C. 453 (CADC 1988); United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 804 (CA1 1988). This [***21] approach is fundamentally inconsistent with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. [HN12] [**LEdHR12] [12] "Our cases have repeatedly rejected" a subjective approach, asking only whether "the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action." Brigham City, 547 U.S., at 404, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d Page 15 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 650 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fisher, 558 U.S., at ___, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410. Indeed, we have never held, outside limited contexts such as an "inventory search or administrative inspection . . . , that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996); see also Brigham City, supra, at 405, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650. The reasons for looking to objective factors, rather than subjective intent, are clear. Legal tests based on reasonableness are generally objective, and this Court has long taken the view that "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the [**878] subjective state of mind of the officer." Horton, supra, at 138, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112. Reasonable foreseeability. Some courts, again including the Kentucky Supreme Court, hold that police may not rely on an exigency if " 'it was [***22] reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances.' 302 S.W.3d, at 656 (quoting Mann v. State, 357 Ark. 159, 172, 161 S.W.3d 826, 834 (2004)); see also, e.g., United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 402 (CA4 2008). Courts applying this test have invalidated warrantless home searches on the ground that it was reasonably foreseeable that police officers, by knocking on the door and announcing their presence, would lead a drug suspect to destroy evidence. See, e.g., id., at 402-403; 302 S.W.3d, at 656. Contrary to this reasoning, however, [HN13] [**LEdHR13] [13] we have rejected the notion that police may seize evidence without a warrant only when they come across the evidence by happenstance. In Horton, as noted, we held that the police may seize evidence in plain view even though the officers may be "interested in an item of evidence and fully expec[t] to find it in the course of a search." 496 U.S., at 138, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112. Adoption of a reasonable foreseeability test would also introduce an unacceptable degree of unpredictability. For example, whenever law enforcement officers knock on the door of premises occupied by a person who may be involved in the [***23] drug trade, there is some possibility that the occupants may possess drugs and may seek to destroy them. Under a reasonable foreseeability test, it would be necessary to quantify the degree of predictability that must be reached before the police-created exigency doctrine comes into play. A simple example illustrates the difficulties that such an approach would produce. Suppose that the officers in the present case did not smell marijuana smoke and thus knew only that there was a 50% chance that the fleeing suspect had entered the apartment on the left rather [*1860] than the apartment on the right. Under those circumstances, would it have been reasonably foreseeable that the occupants of the apartment on the left would seek to destroy evidence upon learning that the police were at the door? Or suppose that the officers knew only that the suspect had disappeared into one of the apartments on a floor with 3, 5, 10, or even 20 units? If the police chose a door at random and knocked for the purpose of asking the occupants if they knew a person who fit the description of the suspect, would it have been reasonably foreseeable that the occupants would seek to destroy evidence? We have noted that [HN14] [**LEdHR14] [14] "[t]he [***24] calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). The reasonable foreseeability test would create unacceptable and unwarranted difficulties for law enforcement officers who must make quick decisions in the field, as well as for judges who would be required to determine after the fact whether the destruction of evidence in response to a knock on the door was reasonably foreseeable based on what the officers knew at the time. Probable cause and time to secure a [**879] warrant. Some courts, in applying the police-created exigency doctrine, fault law enforcement officers if, after acquiring evidence that is sufficient to establish probable cause to search particular premises, the officers do not seek a warrant but instead knock on the door and seek either to speak with an occupant or to obtain consent to search. See, e.g., Chambers, supra, at 569 (citing "[t]he failure to seek a warrant in the face of plentiful probable cause" [***25] as a factor indicating that the police deliberately created the exigency). This approach unjustifiably interferes with legitimate law enforcement strategies. There are many entirely proper reasons why police may not want to seek a search warrant as soon as the bare minimum of evidence needed to establish probable cause is acquired. Without attempting to provide a comprehensive list of these reasons, we note a few. First, the police may wish to speak with the occupants of a dwelling before deciding whether it is worthwhile to seek authorization for a search. They may think that a short and simple conversation may obviate the need to apply for and Page 16 131 S. Ct. 1849, *; 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, **; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3541, ***; 79 U.S.L.W. 4306 execute a warrant. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). Second, the police may want to ask an occupant of the premises for consent to search because doing so is simpler, faster, and less burdensome than applying for a warrant. A consensual search also "may result in considerably less inconvenience" and embarrassment to the occupants than a search conducted pursuant to a warrant. Ibid. Third, law enforcement officers may wish to obtain more evidence before submitting what might otherwise be considered a marginal warrant application. [***26] Fourth, prosecutors may wish to wait until they acquire evidence that can justify a search that is broader in scope than the search that a judicial officer is likely to authorize based on the evidence then available. And finally, in many cases, law enforcement may not want to execute a search that will disclose the existence of an investigation because doing so may interfere with the acquisition of additional evidence against those already under suspicion or evidence about additional but as yet unknown participants in a criminal scheme. We have said that [HN15] [**LEdHR15] [15] "[l]aw enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to criminal investigation [*1861] the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966). Faulting the police for failing to apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible time after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is nowhere to be found in the Constitution. Standard or good investigative tactics. Finally, some lower court cases suggest that law enforcement officers may be found to have created or manufactured an exigency if the court concludes that the course of their investigation was [***27] "contrary to standard or good law enforcement practices (or to the policies or practices of their jurisdictions)." Gould, 364 F.3d, at 591. This approach fails to provide clear guidance for law enforcement officers and authorizes courts to make judgments on matters that are the province of those who are responsible for federal and state law enforcement agencies. C Respondent argues for a rule that [**880] differs from those discussed above, but his rule is also flawed. Respondent contends that law enforcement officers impermissibly create an exigency when they "engage in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is imminent and inevitable." Brief for Respondent 24. In respondent's view, relevant factors include the officers' tone of voice in announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their knocks. But the ability of law enforcement officers to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such subtleties. Police officers may have a very good reason to announce their presence loudly and to knock on the door with some force. A forceful knock may be necessary to alert the occupants that someone is at the door. Cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33, 124 S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (Police "rapped [***28] hard enough on the door to be heard by officers at the back door" and announced their presence, but defendant "was in the shower and testified that he heard nothing"). Furthermore, unless police officers identify themselves loudly enough, occupants may not know who is at their doorstep. Officers are permitted--indeed, encouraged--to identify themselves to citizens, and "in many circumstances this is cause for assurance, not discomfort." United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002). Citizens who are startled by an unexpected knock on the door or by the sight of unknown persons in plain clothes on their doorstep may be relieved to learn that these persons are police officers. Others may appreciate the opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to answer the door to the police. If respondent's test were adopted, it would be extremely difficult for police officers to know how loudly they may announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock on a door without running afoul of the police-created exigency rule. And in most cases, it would be nearly