Problem 6-21: In January 2016, Linda Louise Parnham and Wayne Lee Parnham were divorced. Their final decree of divorce incorporated a negotiated marital dissolution agreement. This agreement disposed of the parties' marital property and debts and made provisions for the custody and support of their sixteen-year-old child, Bubba Sue. Ms. Parnham received custody of Bubba Sue, and Mr. Parnham agreed to pay $437 monthly child support until Bubba Sue reached eighteen years of age. The agreement also provided that Mr. Parnham would pay Bubba Sue's tuition for college, as well as graduate school and professional school should she decide to attend, until Bubba Sue reached the age of 24. In addition, the decree provided that Mr. Parnham would be required to pay Ms. Parnham's attorney's fees, related expenses, and court costs if she was required to return to court to enforce the provisions in the marital dissolution agreement.

In November 2019, Mr. Parnham filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In June 2020, Ms. Parnham filed a petition in state court to enforce the support provisions in the parties' marital dissolution agreement. She asserted that:

1. Bubba Sue decided to transfer from Volunteer State Community College, and
2. Bubba Sue had been admitted to Colgate, and
3. Mr. Parnham refused to pay Bubba Sue's $55,000 Colgate tuition.

Mr. Parnham's answer alleges: (i) Colgate is just a "party school," (ii) his obligation to pay college tuition has been discharged, and (iii) the state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether his obligation to pay college tuition has been discharged.

What can and should Ms. Parnham's attorney do?

Problem 6-22: As a result of his long-time affiliation with Epstein, Nickles was forced to seek relief under Chapter 7. Markell has an unsecured claim against Nickles based on a loan he unadvisedly had made to him. Nickles failed to list Markell's debt on his schedules and Markell did not know or have any reason to know of the filing. Because Nickles case was a "no-asset" case, the notice that was sent to creditors stated that it was not necessary for creditors to file proof of claim forms. See Bankr. Rule 2002(e). After Nickles's discharge is granted, he realizes he forgot to include Markell. Therefore, he petitions the court to allow him to amend his schedules so as to include the debt owing to Markell, claiming that, since no dividend was paid to creditors, the omission did not cause any harm. Markell, who is now served with a copy of the motion, objects on the grounds that his debt is excepted from discharge under section 523(a) (3). How should the court rule on the motion?

Problem 6-23: Placid Oil, a Texas company, owned and operated a large natural gas production and processing facility near Black Lake, Louisiana. The company filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 in 1986. The bankruptcy court set January 31, 1987, as the bar date by which potential creditors were required to file claims. On three occasions in January 1987, Placid published a Notice of Bar Date in the Wall Street Journal, a newspaper of national circulation available in Louisiana. The notice informed creditors of the existence of the bankruptcy case, their opportunity to file proofs of claim, relevant deadlines, consequences of not filing a proof of claim, and how proofs of claim should be filed. On September 30, 1988, the court entered an order confirming Placid's Plan of Reorganization, and providing that all claims against Placid that arose prior to the confirmation date were forever discharged except for Placid's obligations under the Plan. The Plan did not address potential future asbestos liability.

Jimmy Williams worked at the Black Lake facility from 1966 to 1995. During this time Mr. Williams was occupationally exposed to insulation containing asbestos, and his spouse, Myra Williams, was exposed to asbestos dust and fibers when laundering Mr. Williams's clothing. By the early 1980s, Placid was aware, generally, of the hazards of asbestos exposure and, specifically, of Mr. Williams's exposure in the course of his employment. Prior to the Plan's confirmation, no asbestos-related claims had ever been filed against Placid, and the Williamses did not file any proof of claim in the case. Additionally, Mr. Williams testified that he was generally aware of Placid's bankruptcy but does not recall any meetings, updates, or newspaper notices regarding the bankruptcy. To date, Placid has not been found liable in any lawsuit alleging asbestos exposure at a Placid facility, nor has it paid any money to settle such a case.

In 2003, Mrs. Williams's health suddenly deteriorated. She was diagnosed with asbestos-related lung cancer mesothelioma and passed away on August 9, 2003. In March 2004, in Louisiana state court, the Williamses brought a tort action against Placid, alleging that its negligence caused Mrs. Williams's death and attendant damages. In November 2008, Placid filed a motion to reopen its bankruptcy case, and in September 2009, Placid filed a complaint asking the bankruptcy court to determine that the Williamses' claims were discharged. The Williamses argued that they never received notice of Placid's bankruptcy case and that, therefore, their debt was excepted from discharge under $ 523(a)(3)(A). What result in this adversary proceeding? See Williams v. Placid Oil Co. (In re Placid Oil Co.), 753 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2014), a case we mentioned way back in Unit 3 in connection with the discussion of "future claims." PLEASE REFERENCE THE CASE