Q2 Anglo-Dutch auction 11 Points Consider an Anglo-Dutch auction in which one item is for sale. In the first-round of the auction, buyers bid in an ascending-bid auction. The two buyers with the highest bids proceed to the second round. In the second round, the two remaining buyers submit sealed bids (that cannot be lower than the price at which the bidding stopped in the first round) and the buyer with the highest bid wins the item and pays what he or she bid. Valuations are drawn from the uniform(0, 1) distribution. The following table depicts the valuations for each buyer in the auction. Buyer # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 17 0.13134 0.18293 0.18709 0.20800 0.33763 0.34580 0.35594 0.69384 0.77997 0.89265 Assume that buyers always bid according to the relevant symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy. Round all numeric answers to at least three decimal places. Q2.1 2 Points Which two buyers will go on to the second round of the auction? 1 2 3 4 5 LO LO 6 7 8 9 10 Save Answer Q2.2 3 Points In the first-round, what is the value of the highest bid? Round your answer to at least three decimal places. Enter your answer here Q2.3 4 Points In the second round with two buyers remaining, the probability that a buyer with valuation wins is -1, where N is the number of buyers in the first round. Use the revenue equivalence theorem to derive the symmetric equilibrium bidding function b(z) for the buyers in stage two. Show your work. Upload an image of your answer as a pdf file. Please select file(s) Select file(s) Q2.4 2 Points At the end of the auction what is the value of the actual (not expected) revenue that the seller receives? Round your answer to at least three decimal places. Enter your answer here Save Answer