Question
Q4 Sealed-Bid Auctions and Revenue Equivalence There are N risk-neutral bidders with valuations independently drawn from the uniform distribu- tion on [0, 100]. Consider a
Q4 Sealed-Bid Auctions and Revenue Equivalence
There are N risk-neutral bidders with valuations independently drawn from the uniform distribu-
tion on [0, 100]. Consider a sealed-bid auction for a single object. Each bidder i simultaneously
and independently submits a bid bi for an object.
Hint: Review slides 18{22 from the Auction Theory (3a) slide pack to answer this question.
Argue that the equilibrium strategies in a second-price auction do not depend on the number of
bidders.
(a) Determine the equilibrium bid functions for all bidders in a standard second-price auction.
(b) Calculate expected revenue from this auction (you will need the lecture slide \Order Statis-
tics").
It is well-known that both rst-price auction and second-price auction in the canonical model
are ecient, and the revenue equivalence theorem applies.
(c) Find Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid functions for a standard-rst-price auction of the form
bi(vi) = vi using the fact that the revenue generated by the rst-price auction should
be the same as the one generated by the second-price auction.
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