Question 2 Consider the following version of the simultaneous-move game. Player 2 a b Player 1 A 2, 2 3, 4 B 3,4 2, 2 (a) (3 points) Find all Nash equilibria (both in pure and mixed strategies) of the game. Suppose now that players move in sequence: player 1 moves first, and player 2 chooses her action after observing player 1's action. (b) (1 points) Draw the extensive game form of this game. (c) (4 points) Find all subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game. (d) (2 points) Does the dynamic game have a Nash equilibrium which gives payoffs (3,4) and that is not a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game? If yes, specify strategies in such an equilibrium. If not, argue why not