Question 5 of 5 2 Points Consider an auction with two bidders, A and B, whose values of the auctioned item are independent and private. In particular, for each i = A, B, the value V,- has the distribution V,- = 8 Vi = 10 Probability 0.4 0.6 Each bidder submits a sealed bid. The highest bidder wins and pays his/her own bid. If the two bids are the same, then each bidder wins the item with probability 0.5. (a) This is a price sealed bid auction (Enter 1 for "first" and 2 for "second"). (b) If B always bids 10 and A always bids 70% of VA, then A's expected utility is ; B's expected utility when VB = 8 equals (c) If the revenue equivalence property holds, then the expected revenue generated by the auction equals