question2

QUESTION 2 Consider a variant of the Stag Hunt game. There are 10 hunters. Every hunter has two strategies: Stag or Hare. The value of a stag is V and the value of a hare is 1. If a player chooses Hare then the player always captures a hare and receives payoff 1 no matter what other players do. On the other hand, a stag can be caught if and only if {at least 7} players choose Stag. The captured stag is equally shared by the players who chose Stag: for example, if seven hunters catch one stag, then each player will receive a payoff equal to WT. Assume each hunter prefers 1/8 share of a stag to a hare, but prefer a hare to 1/9 (or smaller) share of a stag. In other words, V/B > 1 > V/9 > V11 0. (a) (2pts) ls all-players-choose-Stag a Nash equilibrium? Explain. (b) (2pts) ls all-players-choose-Hare a Nash equilibrium? Explain. (c) (4pts) Are there any other Nash equilibria? if yes find all of them; if not explain why not