Read Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc. case. Answer the questions at the end of the case.

Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc,.144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983)

In this case, plaintiff, Carol Burnett, sued the defendant, the National Enquirer, for compensatory and punitive damages as a result of an article published in a defendant magazine. The article claimed that she became drunk in a public restaurant, had an argument with Henry Kissinger, and disturbed other guests. A jury awarded the plaintiff $300,000 in compensatory damages and $1.3 million as punitive damages. The trial judge reduced the amounts to $50,000 for compensatory and $750,000 for punitive damages. On appeal, the appellate court found the punitive damages still excessive. Defendant's net worth was estimated to be $2.6 million and its net income for the period under consideration was about $1.56 million. The amount of compensatory damages was upheld. The following is an excerpt from the appellate court decision.

Opinion

On March 2, 1976, appellant caused to appear in its weekly publication, the National Enquirer, a "gossip column" headlined "Carol Burnett and Henry K. in Row," wherein a four-sentence item specified in its entirety that: "In a Washington restaurant, a boisterous Carol Burnett had a loud argument with another diner, Henry Kissinger. Then she traipsed around the place offering everyone a bite of her dessert. But Carol really raised eyebrows when she accidentally knocked a glass of wine over one diner and started giggling instead of apologiz-ing. The guy wasn't amused and 'accidentally' spilled a glass of water over Carol's dress."

Maintaining the item was entirely false and libelous, an attorney for Ms. Burnett, by telegram the same day and by letter one week later, demanded its correction or retraction. In response to the demand, appellant on April 6, 1976, published the following retraction, again in the National Enquirer's gossip column: "An item in this column on March 2 erroneously reported that Carol Burnett had an argument with Henry Kissinger at a Washington restaurant and became boisterous, disturbing other guests. We under-stand these events did not occur and we are sorry for any embarrassment our report may have caused Miss Burnett."

On April 8, 1976, respondent, dissatisfied with this effort in mitigation, filed her complaint for libel in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Trial before a jury re-sulted in an award to respondent of $300,000 compen-satory damages and $1.3 million in punitive damages. The trial court thereafter reduced judgment in respon-dent's favor for $50,000 compensatory and $750,000 punitive damages. This appeal followed.

As formulated by appellant, the issues here are whether the damage award and penalty specified in the judgment can stand.

Prior to addressing the merits of appellant's con-tentions and in aid of our disposition, we set out the following further facts pertaining to the publication complained of and descriptive of the nature and char-acter of the National Enquirer, which were adequately established in the proceedings below.

On the occasion giving rise to the gossip col-umn item hereinabove quoted, respondent, her hus-band, and three friends were having dinner at the Rive Gauche restaurant in the Georgetown section of Wash-ington, D.C. The date was January 29, 1976. Respon-dent was in the area as a result of being invited to be a performing guest at the White House. In the course of the dinner, respondent had two or three glasses of wine. She was not inebriated. She engaged in banter with a young couple seated at a table next to hers, who had just become engaged or were otherwise celebrat-ing. When curiosity was expressed about respondent's dessert, apparently a chocolate souffl, respondent saw to it the couple were provided with small amounts of it on plates they had passed to her table for that purpose. Perhaps from having witnessed the gesture, a fam-ily behind respondent then offered to exchange some of their baked Alaska for a portion of the souffl, and they, too, were similarly accommodated. As respon-dent was later leaving the restaurant, she was intro-duced by a friend to Henry Kissinger, who was dining at another table, and after a brief conversation, respon-dent left with her party.

There was no "row" with Mr. Kissinger, nor any argument between the two, and what conversation they had was not loud or boisterous. Respondent never "traipsed around the place offering everyone a bite of her dessert," nor was she otherwise boisterous, nor did she spill wine on anyone, nor did anyone spill water on her and there was no factual basis for the comment that she " . . . started giggling instead of apologizing."

The impetus for what was printed about the dinner was provided to the writer of the item, Brian Walker, by Couri Hays, a freelance tipster paid by the National Enquirer on an ad hoc basis for information supplied by him which was ultimately published by it, who advised Walker he had been informed respon-dent had taken her Grand Marnier souffl around the restaurant in a boisterous or flamboyant manner and given bites of it to various other people; that he had further but unverified information that respondent had been involved in the wine-water spilling incident; but that, according to his sources, respondent was "specifically, emphatically" not drunk. No mention was made by Hays of anything involving respondent and Henry Kissinger. Having received this report, Walker spoke with Steve Tinney, whose name appears at the top of the National Enquirer gossip column, expressing doubts whether Hays could be trusted. Tinney voiced his accord with those doubts. Walker then asked Greg-ory Lyon, a National Enquirer reporter, to verify what Walker had been told by Hays. Lyon's inquiry resulted only in his verifying respondent had shared dessert with other patrons and that she and Kissinger had car-ried on a good-natured conversation at the restaurant.

In spite of the fact that no one had told him re-spondent and Henry Kissinger had engaged in an ar-gument, that the wine-water spilling story remained as totally unverified hearsay, that the dessert-sharing incident was only partially bolstered, and that respon-dent was not under any view of the question inebri-ated, Walker composed the quoted item and approved the "row" heading. . . .

Was there error associated with the award to re-spondent of $750,000 in punitive damages? Yes.

We accept the proposition it is our duty to inter-vene in instances where punitive damages are so pal-pably excessive or grossly disproportionate as to raise a presumption that they resulted from passion or preju-dice. In viewing the record in light of these principles, and assuming, as we will hereinafter decide, that the award of compensatory damages was proper, we are of the opinion that the award to respondent of $750,000 in order to punish and deter appellant was not justified.

We set out preliminarily the following consider-ations and principles fundamental to our conclusions.

Nearly 20 years ago, it was announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that: "The constitutional guarantees relating to protected speech require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defama-tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual mal-icethat is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."

The constitutional privilege thus defined was ex-tended three years later . . . to include within its protec-tion not only public officials but also "public figures," such that: "Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to reputation only on a clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth."

We are persuaded the evidence fairly showed that while appellant's representatives knew that part of the publication complained of was probably false and that the remainder of it in substance might very well be, appellant was nevertheless determined to present to a vast national audience in printed form statements which in their precise import and clear implication were defamatory, thereby exposing respondent to contempt, ridicule and obloquy and tending to injure her in her occupation. We are also satisfied that even when it was thought necessary to alleviate the wrong resulting from the false statements it had placed be-fore the public, the retraction proffered was evasive, incomplete by any standard, legally insufficient. In other words, we have no doubt the conduct of ap-pellant respecting the libel was reprehensible and was undertaken with the kind of improper motive which supports the imposition of punitive damages.

Nevertheless, evidence on the point of appellant's wealth adequately established appellant's net worth to be some $2.6 million and its net income for the pe-riod under consideration to be about $1.56 million, such that the penalty award, even when substantially reduced by the trial court based on its conclusion that the jury's compensatory verdict was "clearly excessive and . . . not supported by substantial evidence," contin-ued to constitute about 35 percent of the former and nearly half the latter.

Such being the case, and in the effort required of us to find acceptable only that balance between the gravity of a defendant's illegal act and a penalty neces-sary to properly deter such conduct, we hold the exem-plary award herein to be excessive and require either that it be reduced to the sum of $150,000 or that appel-lant be granted a new trial on that issue.

We also reject the claim the malice in fact estab-lished herein should not have been attributed to appel-lant, since it is clear to us from the record that the acts of the individuals involved in publishing the defama-tory statements were ratified.

Was there error associated with the award to re-spondent of $50,000? No.

We have previously recited those considerations, both legal and factual, which underlie our conclusion appellant's liability herein was established upon clear and convincing evidence. It remained nevertheless for respondent to establish the actual damage she had suf-fered as a result of the publication involved. Whether such damage necessarily encompassed both special and general damages was a matter dependent upon whether the publication was or was not libelous on its face. . . . A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proxi-mate result thereof.

That what was printed here was libelous on its face seems abundantly clear, in that the message con-veyed was that respondent had been boisterous and loudly argumentative in a public dining place, and had "raised eyebrows" when she boorishly giggled instead of apologizing after spilling wine on another, a message which reasonably carried the implication respondent's actions were the result of some objectionable state of inebriation. Nor is the character of the publication altered by the consideration it might have been inter-preted innocently.

Accordingly, it was incumbent upon respondent to show only those general damages caused by appel-lant's wrong, i.e., damages arising from respondent's loss of reputation, shame, mortification and injured feelings. In this regard her own testimony was to the following effect:"

Q.What was your reaction?

A.Well, I was absoluteI was stunned. . . . I felt very, very angry. I started to cry. I started to shake.

Q.Why such a reaction to this article?

A.Well, it portrays me as being drunk. It portrays me as being rude. It portrays me as being uncaring. It portrays me as being physically abusive. It is dis-gusting, and it is a pack of lies. IIt hurts. It hurts, because words, once they are printed, they've got a life of their own. Words, once spoken, have a life of their own. How was I going to explain to my kids, my family, the people I care about? How am I going to go talk to do things . . . againstalcoholism?

Q.You mentioned something about work against alco-holism. What is that?

A. It didn't start out as any kind of crusade at all. I think I must have spoken about it many years ago. . . . "The foregoing, in our view, when combined with the further evidence of respondent's prominence in the public eye, her professional standing and the fact the National Enquirer is read by some 16 million persons, was sufficient to support an award of $50,000 in com-pensatory damages.

Case Analysis

1. The award of $50,000 was for compensatory dam-ages. Were these for general damages or special damages?

2. Why did the court reduce the amount of punitivedamages? Why was the National Enquirer, asopposed to its employees, held responsible for the punitive damages?

3. Why did the plaintiff in this case recover both com-pensatory and punitive damages, whereas the re-spondent in the Hustler magazine case recovered nothing?