Robert Johnson v. Cintas Corporation & United Healthcare 811 N.W.2d 756 Supreme Court of Wisconsin Decided March 27, 2012

Annette Kingsland Ziegler, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, ... that reversed a default judgment entered by the Kenosha County Circuit Court ... in favor of Robert Johnson (Johnson) and against Cintas Corporation No. 2 (Cintas No. 2). Because Johnsons summons and complaint did not name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant and instead named Cintas Corporation (Cintas), the parent corporation of Cintas No. 2, the court of appeals concluded that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, and therefore, the default judgment is void. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the default judgment and remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. On appeal to this court, Johnson argues that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2 because, despite not being named in the summons and complaint, Cintas No. 2 was served with the summons and complaint and was not prejudiced by Johnsons error. Alternatively, Johnson contends that his plead- ings ought to be construed as only technically defec- tive on the grounds that Cintas No. 2 held itself out as Cintas.... II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In this case, the circuit court granted Johnsons motion to reconsider the courts order vacating the default judgment against Cintas No. 2. The determination of whether to vacate a default judgment is within the circuit courts sound discretion.... We will not disturb the circuit courts discretionary determination to reconsider its order vacating the default judgment unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion.... III. ANALYSIS Wisconsin Stat. ch. 801 governs civil procedure as it re- lates to the commencement of an action. Wisconsin Stat. 801.02(1) provides, in relevant part, that a civil action in which a personal judgment is sought is commenced as to any defendant when a summons and a complaint naming the person as defendant are filed with the court, provided that the defendant is served with an authenticated copy of the summons and complaint within 90 days after filing.... A Wisconsin court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant by proper service of a summons upon the defendant.... Wisconsin Stat. 801.09 lists the required contents of a summons. Relevant to this case, a summons must contain, inter alia,the names and addresses of the parties to the action, plaintiff and defendant. 801.09(1). A summons serves two purposes. First, a summons provides notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against the defendant.... Indeed, notice that apprises a party of the pendency of an action against it and affords the opportunity to pres- ent objections is regarded as [a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process.... Second, consistent with Wis. Stat. 801.05 and 801.11, a summons confers personal jurisdiction on a court over the defendant served.... Given that a defendants constitutional right to due process is at stake, Wisconsin requires strict compliance with its rules of statutory service, even though the con- sequences may appear to be harsh. ... In particular, [t]he service of a summons in a manner prescribed by statute is a condition precedent to a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction,... as any action taken by a court over a defendant not properly served is a deprivation of that defendants constitutional protection.... Signifi- cantly, a defendants actual notice of an action is not alone enough to confer personal jurisdiction upon the court; rather, [s]ervice must be made in accordance with the manner prescribed by statute.... In keeping with the above rule, our courts have recognized a distinction between service that is fun- damentally defective, such that the court lacks per- sonal jurisdiction over the defendant in the first instance, and service that is merely technically defective.... If the defect is fundamental, then the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, regardless of whether or not the defect prejudiced the defendant.... If the defect is technical, however, then the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant only if the complainant can show that the defect did not prejudice the defendant.... The burden rests on the complainant to show that service was not defective or, if service was defective, that the defect was merely technical and did not prejudice the defendant.... ... Johnson urges us to conclude that the circuit court appropriately reconsidered its order vacating the default judgment against Cintas No. 2.... [He] main- tains that he merely misnamed Cintas No. 2 as Cintas in his summons and complaint, and therefore, his plead- ings were only technically defective. He argues that the defect did not prejudice Cintas No. 2 because, pursuant to the circuit courts finding, Cintas No. 2 was served with the summons and complaint. We disagree. We conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it reconsidered its order vacating the default judgment against Cintas No. 2. Johnsons failure to name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant in his summons and complaint, contrary to Wis. Stat. 801.02(1) and 801.09(1), constituted a fundamental defect that deprived the circuit court of personal juris- diction over Cintas No. 2, regardless of whether or not the defect prejudiced Cintas No. 2. Because the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, the default judgment entered against Cintas No. 2 is void. This case is resolved by a straightforward applica- tion of the above-stated law.... [A] complainants fail- ure to name a defendant in the summons and complaint in accordance with Wis. Stat. 801.02(1) and 801.09(1) constitutes a fundamental defect that precludes personal jurisdiction over that defendant, regardless of whether or not the defect prejudiced the defendant.... Here, it is undisputed that Johnson named Cintas, not Cintas No. 2, in his summons and complaint. Cintas No. 2, as a wholly owned subsidiary of Cintas, is a legal entity that exists independently of Cintas.... Johnsons failure to name Cintas No. 2 in his summons and complaint constituted a fundamental defect that precluded the circuit court of personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, regardless of whether or not the defect prejudiced Cintas No. 2. For that reason, it is irrelevant that Johnson served his summons and complaint upon the registered agent for Cintas No. 2 and Cintas No. 2 therefore might have had knowledge that it was meant to be a party.... As far as the law is concerned, Cintas No. 2 was a stranger to the court.... Johnson does not quarrel with the fact that his summons and complaint named the wrong party, Cin- tas, and that the party he intended to sue, Cintas No. 2, is an independent legal entity. Instead, Johnson main- tains that when the party intended to be sued is the entity served, as Cintas No. 2 was in this case, the dis- tinction between a fundamental and technical defect should not depend upon the mere happenstance of whether the misnomer in the summons and complaint corresponds to another, existing legal entity. So long as the right party is the entity served, Johnson con- tends, the purpose of the summons is fulfilled. Ac- cording to Johnson, this courts decision in Ness [v. Digital Dial Communications, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 365 (1999)] ... stands for the proposition that when a plaintiff has served the party he or she intended to sue, a misnomer is subject to correction, without reserving the defendant, even if the misnomer corre- sponds to the actual name of someone else. While Johnsons argument may seem appealing on the surface, it lacks support in the law. To begin with ... a summons that does not name the party in- tended to be sued fails, as a matter of law, to give notice to that party that an action has been com- menced against it.... That the named party happens to have a name that closely resembles the name of the party intended to be sued is simply not enough.... In any event, Johnsons argument rests on the false premise that a summons only purpose is to provide notice to the defendant that an action has been com- menced against it. As set forth above, a summons serves a second and equally significant purpose of conferring personal jurisdiction on a court over the defendant served. This court has made clear that actual notice alone is not enough to confer jurisdic- tion upon the court. Service must be made in accor- dance with the manner prescribed by statute. ... Finally, Johnson contends that even if we con- clude that his failure to name Cintas No. 2 constituted a fundamental defect, we ought to nevertheless con- strue his pleadings as only technically defective on the grounds that Cintas No. 2 held itself out as Cintas.... Again, we decline Johnsons invitation for the simple reason that his argument is without support in the law.... While the circuit court made findings related to the manner in which Cintas No. 2 held itself out to the public and to Johnson specifically, the facts remain that Johnson named Cintas instead of Cintas No. 2 in his summons and complaint, and our courts recognize Cintas No. 2 as a legal entity that exists independently of its parent corporation. Therefore, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2 in the first instance, irrespective of whether Johnson was under the impression that he was suing the right entity or whether Johnson served the right entity. As we have explained, Wisconsin requires plaintiffs to strictly com- ply with our rules of statutory service even though the consequences may appear to be harsh.... It is worth mentioning that the DFI [Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions] records, accessible online to the public unambiguously reveal that Cintas is not a registered corporation in Wisconsin. In any case, if Johnson remained unsure of which entity to name, Cintas or Cintas No. 2, it would have been a simple and routine matter to name them both. IV. CONCLUSION We conclude that service in this case was fundamen- tally defective because Johnson failed to name Cintas No. 2 as a defendant in his summons and complaint, contrary to Wis. Stat. 801.02(1) and 801.09(1). Therefore, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, regardless of whether or not the defect prejudiced Cintas No. 2 and regardless of the manner in which Cintas No. 2 held itself out to the public or to Johnson specifically. Because the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Cintas No. 2, the default judgment entered against Cintas No. 2 is void

1.According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the service of the summons serves what two purposes?

2.Why wasnt the plaintiffs mistake easily correctable as a mere technical violation given that Cintas 2 had actual notice of the suit?